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ABSTRACT 
In 2004, for the first time ever, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
applied the little-known temporary-presence defense of 35 U.S.C. § 272 in National Steel 
Car v. Canadian Pacific Railway. Section 272 provides a defense to patent infringement 
where a foreign vessel, aircraft, or vehicle enters the United States temporarily to engage 
in international commerce.  The purpose behind § 272 is to prevent domestic patent 
enforcement from inhibiting international trade.  Although this defense may not be well 
known yet, the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of § 272 will allow the temporary-
presence defense to become more important as the world continues to become smaller 
and commerce continues to become more global.  Indeed, the vehicles that facilitate 
transnational commerce will increasingly need to rely on § 272 in today’s global 
economy.  This Article first traces the history of the temporary-presence defense, from its 
origins in England and the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1850s through the enactment of 
§ 272 in the United States in 1952.  This Article also discusses U.S. and foreign cases 
applying the temporary-presence defense before National Steel Car. Next, this Article 
analyzes the decisions of the district court and Federal Circuit in National Steel Car and 
concludes that the Federal Circuit was correct in broadly interpreting § 272.  Finally, this 
Article considers what may be the limits of the scope of the temporary-presence defense 
of § 272. 
 
1INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, for the first time ever, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
applied the little-known temporary-presence defense of 35 U.S.C. § 272 in National Steel 
Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway.1 This Federal Circuit decision demonstrated that 
§ 272 can provide an accused infringer with a powerful defense to patent infringement 
where a foreign vessel, aircraft, or vehicle enters the United States temporarily.2
Although this defense may not be well known yet, the temporary-presence defense of 
§ 272 should become more important as the world continues to become smaller and 
commerce continues to become more global. 
Section 272, entitled “Temporary presence in the United States,” provides: 
 The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or 
vehicle of any country which affords similar privileges to 
vessels, aircraft or vehicles of the United States, entering 
the United States temporarily or accidentally, shall not 
constitute infringement of any patent, if the invention is 
used exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft or 
vehicle and is not offered for sale or sold in or used for the 
 
1 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
2 See id. at 1326 (“In gross, section 272 provides that the use of certain foreign-
owned means of transit or transport entering into the jurisdiction of the United States 
‘temporarily or accidentally’ is not an infringing use provided a host of conditions are 
satisfied.”).  Although § 272 and similar provisions distinguish between “vessels,” 
“aircraft,” and “vehicles,” see United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Mass. 
2002), this Article sometimes uses the word “vehicle” as shorthand to refer to all three. 
2manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the 
United States.3
Thus, the temporary-presence defense of § 272 has five requirements: 
(1) Vessel, aircraft, or vehicle—the accused invention must be used in a 
vessel, aircraft, or vehicle; 
(2) Reciprocity—the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle must be from another country 
that provides a similar defense to U.S. vessels, aircraft, or vehicles; 
(3) Temporary or accidental presence—the vessel, aircraft of vehicle must be 
present in the United States only temporarily or accidentally; 
(4) Exclusively for the needs of the vehicle—The accused invention must be 
used “exclusively for the needs” of the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle; and 
(5) No U.S. sales or manufacturing activity —the accused infringer must not 
sell or offer to sell the accused invention, nor use it to manufacture anything to be sold in 
or exported from the United States.4
The major object and underlying policy of § 272 is to prevent patent enforcement 
from inhibiting international commerce.5 According to the Federal Circuit: 
 [The temporary-presence defense] demonstrate[s] a 
concern to leave the channels of international commerce, or 
more accurately the vessels and vehicles that pass through 
these channels, free from the excessive burdens that would 
result if such vessels or vehicles had to conform to the 
patent laws of all nations that the vessel or vehicle visited 
during its lifetime.  Different inventions are likely to be 
 
3 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
4 Id.; see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 240 (1993) 
(describing the five elements of § 272). 
5 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330. 
3patented in different countries, and the same invention may 
be owned by different parties in different countries.  In 
section 272, Congress intended to join an international 
movement to place foreign-owned means of international 
transport beyond the reach of domestic patentees’ exclusive 
rights because the cost of complying with multiple, 
inconsistent rights of exclusion provided by the patent 
regimes of a large number of countries would likely place 
an excessive drag on international commerce.6
Thus, the temporary-presence defense strikes a balance between a patentee’s right to 
exclude and the exigencies of international trade.7
6 Id.; see also Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 
1974) (“It is difficult to see any other purpose in Section 272 and Article 5ter than to 
meet the needs and realities of international trade and navigation.”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 
(2d Cir. 1975) (unpublished table decision).  Similarly, a commentator in 1930 described 
the policy behind the temporary-presence defense as follows: 
 The right of the patentee to prevent the use of his 
invention in foreign vessels or other means of 
transportation coming temporarily into the jurisdiction of a 
state may cause much inconvenience to the freedom of 
communication.  It is too rigid to require a foreigner, who 
may be altogether ignorant of the grant of a patent in a 
country, to secure a license from the patentee for the use of 
the invention at the risk of being subjected to seizure of the 
machine or engine employed in the construction, fitting out, 
or functioning of his vessel or other means of 
transportation. 
STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 246 
(1930). 
7 See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330; Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace:  
Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 TULANE L. REV. 1, 66
(1993); cf. Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1125-26 (“[T]he patent law must not be so interpreted as 
4In today’s global economy, the importance of the temporary-presence defense 
should continue to increase.  Since the enactment of § 272 in 1952,8 U.S. commerce has 
 
to impair the treaty-making capacity of the nation or to clog its power to regulate foreign 
commerce (since that would make patent grants a surrender pro tanto of ‘sovereignty’ to 
private persons) . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
Interestingly, one commentator has proposed using the balance struck by the 
temporary-presence defense of § 272 as a model for dealing with the issue of “enforc[ing] 
patent rights infringed by international data communications.”  Burk, supra, at 66.  He 
suggests that: 
 The temporary presence doctrine represents judicial 
recognition that the balance struck in the quid pro quo 
patent bargain may be upset by international policy 
considerations, particularly when the harm to the patent 
holder is slight.  Courts that are asked to enforce patent 
rights infringed by international data communications will 
be required to engage in a similar calculus:  the patent 
incentive created by Congress must not be eroded, but at 
the same time, mechanical application of its provisions 
cannot be allowed to compromise important international 
goals.  Systematic, substantial inroads into a patent holder’s 
exclusivity by, for instance, an offshore data haven, are 
likely to render the patent worthless and must be 
discouraged.  Particularly when such activity by data 
service providers or subscribers knowingly encroaches on 
the patent, imposition of liability for direct infringement 
and inducement would be appropriate.  By contrast, when 
computer network activity occasionally and unwittingly 
impinges on the scope of a U.S. patent, the burdens on the 
U.S. international position imposed on society by judicial 
enforcement of the patent may exceed the value of the 
patent incentive. 
Id. 
8 See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9, 28 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2402, 2422. 
5become increasingly global in nature.9 In particular, the manufacturing of goods now 
regularly occurs across borders,10 a phenomenon in which lower-cost transportation has 
 
9 See Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace:  A Proposal for an 
American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607, 617 (2004) (“Advances in 
technology and transportation have created a global economy in which American firms 
must compete on an international basis.”); Michael S. Knoll, Perchance to Dream:  The 
Global Economy and the American Dream, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1603 (1993) 
(“Between 1950 and 1980, the share of U.S. gross national product (‘GNP’) involved in 
international trade increased nearly tenfold, from two percent to almost twenty percent.”).  
Indeed, in 2004, U.S. international trade of goods comprised over 1.4-trillion dollars in 
imports and over 800-billion dollars in exports.  U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade 
Division, U.S. Trade in Goods and Services (June 10, 2005), 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf. 
10 See Arthur Donovan, The Impact of Containerization:  From Adam Smith to the 
21st Century, REV. OF BUS., October 1, 2004, at 10, 14 (“Industrial production is widely 
distributed rather than concentrated, and sub-assemblies and semi-finished components 
are routinely shipped in containers across borders and oceans . . . .”); Binyamin 
Netanyahu, We’re Just Getting Started, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 4, 2005, Opinion, 17 
(“Today, we live in a world of choice, . . . where goods can be manufactured on the other 
side of the globe and shipped at a pace scarcely imaginable a few decades ago.”); see also 
ROGER ALCALY, THE NEW ECONOMY 128-29 (2003) (describing how Dell Computer 
ships computers to its customers by having shipping companies combine its computers 
made in Austin, Texas with monitors made in Mexico). 
6played a major role.11 Thus, the vehicles that facilitate this transnational commerce will 
increasingly need to rely on the temporary-presence defense of § 272 to prevent patent 
enforcement from interfering with this important international trade.  Vehicles such as 
refrigerated trucks, specially modified rail cars, and unique freight aircraft have become 
more important in the global economy, thus making the temporary-presence defense 
more important.  Moreover, the importance of international shipping will likely continue 
to increase,12 thus making the temporary-presence defense of § 272 of even greater 
importance in the future. 
As discussed in detail in this Article, the temporary-presence defense first 
originated in England in the 1850s.  The defense then came to America via a Supreme 
 
11 See Befort, supra note 9, at 617 (“Advances in technology and transportation 
have created a global economy . . . .”); George K. Walker, Information Warfare and 
Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1088 (2000) (“The global economy was 
made possible by modern transportation.”); see also Donovan, supra note 10, at 13-14 
(“[C]ontainerization has taken global commerce to new levels of integration and has 
brought greatly increased wealth to many parts of the world.  Before the 1960s, moving 
general cargoes across oceans cost roughly 10 to 15 percent of the retail value of the 
goods carried. . . . Today the cost of shipping goods in containers is between one and two 
percent of retail value, 90 percent less than before containerization.”). 
12 Chicago:  Portal to the World, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUTION, May 2003, at 51, 56 
(“[I]nternational freight volumes are growing faster than domestic volume and will 
almost double by 2020.”). 
7Court decision in 1856, Brown v. Duchesne,13 which held that even though there was no 
temporary-presence statute in effect at the time, a foreign ship was exempt from patent-
infringement liability where it was only temporarily present in the United States.  Next, 
the temporary-presence defense went global in 1925 when it was incorporated into the 
Paris Convention.  Finally, Congress enacted § 272 as part of the Patent Act of 1952 to 
codify the holding of the Supreme Court and the requirements of the Paris Convention. 
Although sparse, the case law applying § 272 up to and including National Steel 
Car shows the variety of transportation means to which § 272 can apply.  Before 
National Steel Car, there were only two cases that interpreted § 272.14 In the first of 
these cases, Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc.,15 a district court in 1974 held that § 272 provided 
a complete defense to patent infringement for aircraft that were temporarily present in the 
United States.  In the second case, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,16 the United 
States Court of Federal Claims in 1993 held that § 272 provided a patent-infringement 
defense for certain spacecraft.   
Moreover, temporary-presence-defense statutes analogous to § 272 exist in many 
countries, so there are foreign cases interpreting these statutes.  In particular, two cases 
are notable.  In the first such case, Rolltrailer,17 a German court in 1973 held that the 
 
13 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856). 
14 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
15 380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975). 
16 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993). 
17 LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.). 
8German temporary-presence statute protected vehicles called “roll trailers” from 
infringement liability.  In the second such foreign case of interest, Stena Rederi AB v. 
Irish Ferries Ltd.,18 an English court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute 
exempted certain ferries from infringement. 
Most recently, an accused infringer invoked the temporary-presence defense of 
§ 272 in National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway.19 In National Steel Car,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in 2003 that the 
temporary-presence defense of § 272 did not apply to certain Canadian rail cars that 
entered the United States, delivered lumber to U.S. destinations, and then returned empty 
to Canada.20 In reaching its conclusion, the district court narrowly interpreted the 
elements of § 272, unlike previous courts that considered similar issues.  However, in 
2004, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that the defense 
did apply.21 In so doing, the Federal Circuit broadly interpreted § 272.  Thus, § 272 
remains a potentially powerful defense to patent infringement for operators of foreign 
 
18 [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.).   
19 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
20 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 556 
(E.D. Pa. 2003), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
21 NSC II, 357 F.3d 1319. 
9vessels, aircraft, and vehicles of many different types that are present only temporarily in 
the United States—a veritable “planes, trains, and automobiles”22 defense. 
This Article discusses the history and application of the temporary-presence 
defense of § 272.  Part I of this Article describes the origins of the temporary-presence 
defense and § 272.  Next, Part II examines the judicial interpretation of § 272 and the 
temporary-presence defense, discussing the two cases interpreting § 272 before National 
Steel Car, as well as two foreign cases of interest.  Part III of this Article then analyzes 
the National Steel Car case.  This Part discusses the decisions of both the district court 
and Federal Circuit, contrasts the two decisions, and argues that the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 272 was correct.  Finally, Part IV considers what may be the limits of 
the scope of § 272. 
I. ORIGINS OF 35 U.S.C. § 272 AND THE TEMPORARY-PRESENCE DEFENSE 
This Part discusses the origins of § 272 and the temporary-presence defense.  Part 
I.A discusses the origins of the temporary-presence defense in England in the 1850s.  
Next, Part I.B examines the first application of the temporary-presence defense in the 
United States by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne. After that, Part I.C considers 
the international adoption of the defense by its incorporation into the Paris Convention as 
Article 5ter. Finally, Part I.D describes the enactment of § 272 itself. 
 
22 Planes, Trains & Automobiles was a 1987 movie starring Steve Martin and 
John Candy.  LEONARD MALTIN’S MOVIE GUIDE 1090 (Leonard Maltin ed., 2005 ed., 
2004). 
10 
A. ORIGINS IN ENGLAND 
The temporary-presence defense originated in England in the 1850s.23 After a 
court rejected the defense, England enacted the first temporary-presence statute.24 
An accused infringer first raised the temporary-presence defense in Caldwell v. 
Vanvlissengen25 in the Chancery Court in 1851, but the court rejected the defense.26 In 
Caldwell, the patent at issue covered an improvement to a ship’s propeller.27 The 
accused infringers were from Holland and used this invention in Dutch ships that traveled 
between Holland and England to engage in trade.28 Thus, the ships were only 
 
23 Maurice A. Moffat, Section 23 of the Patent Act and the St. Lawrence Seaway,
31 C.P.R. 27, 28-30 (1959); see Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198 (1856); 
LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Rajita Sharma & Heather Forrest, Case Comment, A
Lifeline for Infringing Ships, 2003 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 430, 434. 
24 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198; LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Sharma & 
Forrest, supra note 23, at 434. 
25 9 Hare 415 (Ch. 1851) (Eng.). 
26 Id. at 427-31; LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Moffat, supra note 23, at 28-30; 
Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 434. 
27 Caldwell, 9 Hare at 425.  The court referred to the invention as a “screw 
propeller.”  E.g., id. 
28 Id. at 417-19.  Additionally, according to the accused infringers, the invention 
in question was not covered by a Dutch patent and “had been openly used and exercised 
in . . . Holland.”  Id. at 417-18. 
11 
temporarily present in English waters.29 The patentee sought a preliminary injunction 
preventing this use.30 In response, the accused infringers argued that the court should not 
“grant an injunction restraining the use by foreigners of the patent on board a ship built in 
a foreign country at amity with England, and manned and owned by the subjects of that 
country.”31 The accused infringers further argued: 
If a right of this kind were asserted against foreigners 
coming to [England] it would be a source of great 
inconvenience.  There was not an article which a foreigner 
might bring to this country for his use or comfort but might 
be the subject of a patent, and, therefore, the subject of an 
application against him.  The right, if it existed, might even 
be asserted against a ship accidentally driven into an 
English port by a tempest or stranded on the coast.32 
Although the accused infringers did not characterize their defense as a “temporary-
presence” defense, the essence of their argument was that their use of an invention 
covered by an English patent on a foreign ship should not amount to infringement where 
 
29 See id. at 417-19. 
30 See id. at 423 (describing the issue as “whether the Court will interfere to 
protect a patentee before he has established his right at law, or will suspend its 
interference until the right at law has been established”). 
31 Id. at 421. 
32 Id. at 422.  This argument is very similar to the Federal Circuit’s description of 
the underlying purpose and policy of § 272.  Compare id., with Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. 
Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  See supra text 
accompanying note 6 for a quote of this description. 
12 
the ship would be present in English waters only temporarily for the purpose of engaging 
in international trade.33 
The court rejected the infringers’ temporary-presence defense.34 The court first 
noted the “universal” rule “that foreigners are in all cases subject to the laws of the 
country in which they happen to be.”35 The court then observed: 
[U]ndoubtedly [the patent] grant gives to the grantee a right 
of action against persons who infringe upon the sole and 
exclusive right purported to be granted by it.  Foreigners 
coming into [England] are, as I apprehend, subject to 
actions for injuries done by them whilst here to the subjects 
of the Crown.  Why then are they not to be subject to 
actions for the injury done by their infringing upon the sole 
and exclusive right, which I have shewn to be granted in 
conformity with the laws and constitution of this country?  
And if they are subject to such actions, why is not the 
power of this Court, which is founded upon the 
insufficiency of the legal remedy, to be applied against 
them as well as against the subjects of the Crown.36 
Ultimately, the court observed that the accused infringers’ argument “resolves itself into 
a question of national policy, and it is for the Legislature, and not for the Courts, to deal 
with that question:  my duty is to administer the law and not to make it.”37 Thus, the 
court rejected the temporary-presence defense and granted the preliminary injunction.38 
33 See Caldwell, 9 Hare at 421-23. 
34 Id. at 423-31. 
35 Id. at 425. 
36 Id. at 427-28. 
37 Id. at 430.  In contrast, a few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 
reasoning of Caldwell and did not hesitate to interpret U.S. patent law as incorporating a 
temporary-presence defense, even in the absence of any explicit statute.  See Brown v. 
13 
In 1852 in response to the court’s holding in Caldwell, England amended its 
patent law to provide for the first temporary-presence defense to patent infringement.39 
Members of the House of Commons believed that the absence of such a provision would 
hamper commerce between England and other countries.40 This first temporary-presence 
statute read: 
No letters patent for any invention (granted after the 
passing of this Act) shall extend to prevent the use of such 
invention in any foreign ship or vessel, or for the 
navigation of any foreign ship or vessel, which may be in 
any port of Her Majesty’s dominions, or in any of the 
waters within the jurisdiction of any of Her Majesty’s 
Courts, where such invention is not so used for the 
manufacture of any goods or commodities to be vended 
within or exported from Her Majesty’s dominions:  
Provided always, that this enactment shall not extend to the 
ships or vessels of any foreign state of which the laws 
authorize subjects of such foreign state, having patents or 
like privileges for the exclusive use or exercise of 
inventions within its territories, to prevent or interfere with 
the use of such inventions in British ships or vessels, or in 
or about the navigation of British ships or vessels, while in 
the ports of such foreign state, or in the waters within the 
jurisdiction of its Courts, where such inventions are not so 
used for the manufacture of goods or commodities to be 
 
Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198-99 (1856).  For a discussion of Brown, see infra 
Part I.B. 
38 Caldwell, 9 Hare at 430.  The accused infringers did not appeal the decision in 
Caldwell. Moffat, supra note 23, at 28. 
39 LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Moffat, supra note 23, at 28-30; Sharma & 
Forrest, supra note 23, at 434. 
40 Moffat, supra note 23, at 28. 
14 
vended within or exported from the territories of such 
foreign state.41 
Like § 272, today’s U.S. temporary-presence statute, the first British statute:  (1) 
applied to foreign ships temporarily present in the country; (2) excluded from the defense 
the use of the patented invention for manufacturing; and (3) required reciprocity between 
the two countries at issue with respect to providing a temporary-presence defense.42 
However, two important differences between the current U.S. provision and the first 
British statute are:  (1) the British statute applied only to ships and not to aircraft or land 
vehicles, whereas the U.S. provision applies to all three; and (2) the British statute 
applied to any use of a patented invention in a vessel or for the navigation of a vessel, 
whereas the U.S. statute applies only where the patented invention is used exclusively for 
the needs of the vessel.43 Although it has since been amended, the United Kingdom still 
has a temporary-presence-defense statute today.44 
Soon after its first appearance in England in 1852, the temporary-presence 
defense migrated across the Atlantic to the United States. 
 
41 Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted) (quoting British Act of 1852, Clause XXVI). 
42 Compare Moffat, supra note 23, at 30 (quoting British Act of 1852, Clause 
XXVI), with 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
43 Compare Moffat, supra note 23, at 30, with § 272.
44 Patents Act, 1977, § 60 (U.K.).  For a quote of this statute, see infra text 
accompanying note 193. 
15 
B. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: BROWN V. DUCHESNE 
Soon after the passage of the first British temporary-presence statute but long 
before the existence of such a U.S. statute, the temporary-presence defense was first 
applied in the United States in 1856 by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne.45 In 
Brown, the patentee owned a patent on “a new and useful improvement in constructing 
the gaff of sailing vessels.”46 The accused infringer was a French citizen, who used the 
patented invention on a French ship that traveled between a French colony and Boston.47 
No French patent covered the invention.48 Indeed, the patentee admitted “that the [ship] 
was a foreign vessel, lawfully in a port of the United States for the purposes of 
 
45 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856); see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 
Fed. Cl. 197, 231 (1993) (“The temporary presence doctrine was enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne . . . .”).  The first (and only) U.S. temporary-
presence statute, 35 U.S.C. § 272, was not enacted until the Patent Act of 1952, S. REP.
NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402, almost a 
century after the Court’s 1856 decision in Brown.
46 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 193.  A “gaff” is “[a] spar attached to the mast and 
used to extend the upper edge of a fore-and-aft sail.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 740 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY].  A “spar” is “[a] wooden or metal pole, such as a mast, boom, 
yard, or bowsprit, used to support sails and rigging.”  Id. at 1727. 
47 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 193. 
48 See id. at 194. 
16 
commerce, and that the improvement in question was placed on her in a foreign port to fit 
her for sea.”49 Thus, the Court framed the issue as: 
whether any improvement in the construction or equipment 
of a foreign vessel, for which a patent has been obtained in 
the United States, can be used by such vessel within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, while she is temporarily 
there for the purposes of commerce, without the consent of 
the patentee.50 
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roger Taney, the Supreme Court held that 
the temporary presence of the ship in the United States provided the accused infringer 
with a defense to infringement liability.51 The Court reasoned that such a result flowed 
from a proper construction of the patent infringement statute.52 The Court began by 
noting that a literal interpretation of the language of the statute did not allow for a 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. at 198-99. 
52 Id. at 194-97.    The patent infringement provision in effect in 1856 read: 
[I]f any person shall make, devise and use, or sell the thing 
so invented, the exclusive right of which shall, as aforesaid, 
have been secured to any person by patent, without the 
consent of the patentee, his executors, administrators or 
assigns, first obtained in writing, every person so 
offending, shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that 
shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the 
patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, the 
use of the said invention; which may be recovered in an 
action on the case founded on this act, in the circuit court of 
the United States, or any other court having competent 
jurisdiction. 
9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS App. 10-3 (2004) (quoting Patent Act of 
1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323, § 5 (1793)). 
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temporary-presence defense to infringement.53 However, the Court interpreted the statute 
by looking beyond its plain language: 
[I]t is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court 
will not look merely to a particular clause in which general 
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the 
whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the 
objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various 
provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry 
into execution the will of the Legislature, as thus 
ascertained, according to its true intent and meaning.54 
The Court further described its approach as follows: 
 Neither will the court, in expounding a statute, give 
to it a construction which would in any degree disarm the 
Government of a power which has been confided to it to be 
used for the general good—or which would enable 
individuals to embarrass it, in the discharge of the high 
duties it owes to the community—unless plain and express 
 
53 See id. at 194 (“The general words used in the clause of the patent laws 
granting the exclusive right to the patentee to use the improvement, taken by themselves, 
and literally construed, without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction the 
claim of the plaintiff.”).  
54 Id. Such an approach to statutory interpretation was consistent with precedent 
at the time.  See, e.g., United States v. Boisdore’s Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 
(1850) (“In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member 
of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”).  
Indeed, the Court still uses such an approach to statutory interpretation today.  See, e.g.,
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determining the meaning of the 
statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the 
statute as a whole and to its object and policy.”). 
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words indicated that such was the intention of the 
Legislature.55 
The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend the patent infringement statute to 
reach foreign vessels temporarily present in the United States because the constitutional 
authority for the patent laws was the Patent Clause, rather than the Commerce Clause.56 
The Court observed that where Congress was legislating “to protect authors and 
inventors,” Congress was presumably acting under the domestic power granted by the 
Patent Clause, “and it ought not lightly to be presumed that they intended to go beyond it, 
and exercise another and distinct power, conferred on them for a different purpose.”57 
55 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 195.  The Court uses the word “embarrass” 
several times throughout the Brown opinion.  See id. at 195, 197, 198.  At the time of 
Brown, the primary meaning of “embarrass” differed from its current connotation.  In 
1856, the primary meaning of “embarrass” was “[t]o perplex ; to render intricate ; to 
entangle.”  NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 388 
(1854).  In contrast, today “embarrass” typically connotes the causing of discomfort or 
abashment.  See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 600 (“To 
cause to feel self-conscious or ill at ease; disconcert . . . .”). 
56 Id. The Patent Clause grants Congress the power “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8.  The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
57 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 195. 
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The Court then noted that the Patent Clause “confers no power on Congress to regulate 
commerce, or the vehicles of commerce, which belong to a foreign nation, and 
occasionally visit our ports in their commercial pursuits.”58 
58 Id. The Court also noted that the patent laws “do not, and were not intended to, 
operate beyond the limits of the United States.”  Id. Indeed, courts cite Brown most often 
for this principle—that U.S. patent law has no extraterritorial effect.  See, e.g., Deepsouth 
Packing Co. v. The Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527, 531 (1972) (citing Brown, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) at 195); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 195).  This principle is now 
axiomatic.  See id. 
In contrast, the Court in Brown noted that U.S. law does apply to foreigners 
present in the United States.   Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 194 (“[U]ndoubtedly every 
person who is found within the limits of a Government, whether for temporary purposes 
or as a resident, is bound by its laws. . . .”).  Similarly, the English court in Caldwell 
observed that English law applied to foreigners present in Great Britain.  Caldwell v. 
Vanvlissengen, 9 Hare 415, 428 (Ch. 1851) (Eng.).  However, unlike the Court in Brown,
the court in Caldwell applied this principle in concluding that a foreign ship temporarily 
present in the country was liable for patent infringement.  See id. at 427-31 (rejecting the 
temporary-presence defense); see also supra Part I.A (discussing Caldwell).  Thus, the 
Court’s holding in Brown that the patent laws did not apply to a foreign vessel using a 
patented invention while temporarily present in the United States was far from a foregone 
conclusion. 
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The Court then further reasoned that there was no infringement liability because 
there was at most only a minimal “use” of the patented invention in the United States, 
other than in navigating in and out of the harbor.59 The Court observed that the patentee 
suffered no real damage from a foreign vessel’s use of his patented invention.60 The 
Court noted that the accused infringer only derived a benefit from the use of the patented 
invention while the ship was on “the high seas,” not while it was sitting in the harbor in 
the United States.61 The Court contrasted this minimal use of the patented invention with 
a hypothetical situation in which the accused infringer made or sold the invention in the 
United States, in which infringement liability would lie.62 
59 See Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 196.  The Court stated: 
[S]o far as the mere use is concerned, the vessel could 
hardly be said to use it while she was at anchor in the port, 
or lay at the wharf.  It was certainly of no value to her 
while she was in the harbor; and the only use made of it, 
which can be supposed to interfere with the rights of the 
plaintiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of the 
harbor, when she arrived or was about to depart, and while 
she was within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
Id. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. However, the court interpreting § 272 in Cali in 1974 questioned the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of the use of the patented invention in Brown as non-
damaging.  Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Such 
a use within the United States would not, perhaps, today be characterized as trivial and 
non-damaging since it was inevitable and necessary . . . .”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 
1975); see infra Part II.A (discussing Cali). 
62 Id. 
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Thus, the Court concluded that the patent infringement statute could not be 
construed to cover patented inventions used in foreign vessels while only temporarily 
present in the United States.63 According to the Court: 
[S]uch a construction would be inconsistent with the 
principles that lie at the foundation of [the patent] laws; and 
instead of conferring legal rights on the inventor, in order 
to do equal justice between him and those who profit by his 
invention, they would confer a power to exact damages 
where no real damage had been sustained, and would 
moreover seriously embarrass the commerce of the country 
with foreign nations. We think these laws ought to be 
construed in the spirit in which they were made—that is, as 
founded in justice—and should not be strained by technical 
constructions to reach cases which Congress evidently 
could not have contemplated, without departing from the 
principle upon which they were legislating, and going far 
beyond the object they intended to accomplish.64 
The Court went on to discuss that a construction failing to recognize a temporary-
presence defense would improperly confer political power on patentees, rather than just a 
property right.65 The Court explained that such a construction would “enable [patentees] 
to embarrass the treaty-making power in its negotiations with foreign nations, and also to 
interfere with the legislation of Congress when exercising its constitutional power to 
 
63 See id. at 196-97. 
64 Id. at 197.  It is ironic that the Court considered that it would be a “strained . . . 
technical construction[]” to interpret the statute according to its plain language as 
applying to any “use within the United States.”  Id. Arguably, it is the Court’s 
interpretation that is strained in its holding that despite the plain language of the statute 
there is no infringement where a foreign vessel uses a patented invention while 
temporarily present in the United States.  
65 See id. at 197-98. 
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regulate commerce.”66 The Court then observed that the patentee’s proposed 
construction would give the patentee a private right at the expense of public rights:  “[N]o 
sound rule of interpretation would justify the court in giving to the general words used in 
the patent laws the extended construction claimed by the plaintiff, in a case like this, 
where public rights and the interests of the whole community are concerned.”67 
66 Id. at 197.  The Court noted that 
if a treaty should be negotiated with a foreign nation, by 
which the vessels of each party were to be freely admitted 
into the ports of the other, upon equal terms with its own, 
upon the payment of the ordinary port charges, and the 
foreign Government faithfully carried it into execution, yet 
the Government of the United States would find itself 
unable to fulfill its obligations if the foreign ship had about 
her, in her construction or equipment, anything for which a 
patent had been granted. 
Id. 
67 Id. at 198.  Brown v. Duchesne provides an early example of where the 
Supreme Court held that the public interest trumped private property rights.  See id. In 
discussing Brown in the context of interpreting § 272, the district court in Cali in 1974 
cited a much later case, Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-44 
(1934), for the proposition that “Brown v. Duchesne means at minimum that the patent 
law must not be so interpreted as to impair the treaty-making capacity of the nation or to 
clog its power to regulate foreign commerce (since that would make patent grants a 
surrender pro tanto of ‘sovereignty’ to private persons).”  Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 
F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (also citing Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 
294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935)), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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Similar to its much earlier holding in Brown, the Court’s holding in Blaisdell 
recognized that public concerns sometimes must trump private rights.  See Blaisdell, 290
U.S. at 442.  In Blaisdell, in the context of interpreting the Contract Clause, the Court 
was confronted with the tension between the public interest and private contract rights.  
See id. at 442-44.  The Court in Blaisdell described the evolutionary nature of the issue of 
public versus private rights under the Contract Clause: 
It is manifest . . . that there has been a growing appreciation 
of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a 
rational compromise between individual rights and public 
welfare.  The settlement and consequent contraction of the 
public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing 
density of population, the interrelation of the activities of 
our people and the complexity of our economic interests, 
have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization 
of society in order to protect the very bases of individual 
opportunity.  Where, in earlier days, it was thought that 
only the concerns of individuals or of classes were 
involved, and that those of the state itself were touched 
only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental 
interests of the state are directly affected; and that the 
question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract 
as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to 
safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of 
all depends. 
Id.; see also Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision:  A 
Historical Study Of Contract Clause Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. REV. 513, 516 (1993) 
(“[Blaisdell’s] points about the public interest in private contracts reflect an evolutionary 
process . . . .”).  Confirming the evolutionary nature of this issue is Justice Cardozo’s 
unpublished concurring opinion in Blaisdell: “The . . . court in its interpretation of the 
contract clause has been feeling its way toward a rational compromise between private 
rights and public welfare.”  G. Edward White, The “Constitutional Revolution” as a 
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Finally, the Court expressly rejected the patentee’s argument that the Court should 
adopt the holding of the English case of Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen.68 In Caldwell, the 
court concluded that “the question of the exemption of foreign vessels [from patent 
infringement] is one of national policy, and to be dealt with by the Legislature, rather 
than by the courts.”69 In rejecting the reasoning of Caldwell, the Court stated that it 
“must interpret our patent laws with reference to our own Constitution and laws and 
judicial decisions.”70 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the accused infringer should not be liable for 
patent infringement because of the temporary-presence doctrine: 
[T]he rights of property and exclusive use granted to a 
patentee does [sic] not extend to a foreign vessel lawfully 
entering one of our ports; and that the use of such 
improvement, in the construction, fitting out, or equipment 
of such vessel, while she is coming into or going out of a 
port of the United States, is not an infringement of the 
rights of an American patentee, provided it was placed 
upon her in a foreign port, and authorized by the laws of 
the country to which she belongs.71 
Thus, by Supreme Court precedent, the temporary-presence defense became part of U.S. 
patent law in 1856, long before the existence of a temporary-presence statute. 
 
Crisis in Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 884 (1997).  Thus, the holding in Brown may 
have been ahead of its time. 
68 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198 (citing Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen, 9 Hare 415 
(Ch. 1851) (Eng.)).  For a discussion of Caldwell, see supra Part I.A. 
69 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 184. 
70 Id. at 198. 
71 Id. at 198-99. 
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C. ARTICLE 5TER OF THE PARIS CONVENTION 
Eventually, the temporary-presence defense was adopted internationally.  The 
first general temporary-presence-defense provision72 was added to the Paris Convention 
in 1925.73 The Paris Convention was “the first major international treaty designed to help 
 
72 Although the Paris Convention contained the first general temporary-presence 
provision covering ships, land vehicles, and aircraft, several years earlier in 1919 a 
temporary-presence provision was incorporated into the 1919 Convention for the 
Regulation of Aerial Navigation.  LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Sharma & Forrest, supra 
note 23, at 434.  This provision read: 
 Every aircraft passing through the territory of a 
contracting State, including landing and stoppages 
reasonably necessary for the purpose of such transit, shall 
be exempt from any seizure on the ground of infringement 
of patent, design, or model, subject to the deposit of 
security the amount of which in default of amicable 
agreement shall be fixed with the least delay by the 
competent authority of the place of seizure. 
LADAS, supra note 6, at 246 (quoting Article 18 of the 1919 Convention); accord Sharma 
& Forrest, supra note 23, at 434 n.12.   As one commentator described, this provision 
was quite limited compared to the later provision of the Paris Convention: 
 This timid attempt concerned only aircraft.  
Furthermore, it did not declare permissible the use of a 
patented invention in its construction, fitting out, or 
functioning.  The Convention exempted aircraft from 
seizure only on condition of deposit of security. 
LADAS, supra note 6, at 247; see also Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 434-35. 
73 LADAS, supra note 6, at 247; Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 435.  The 
original version of this temporary-presence provision, Article 5ter, read: 
26 
the people of one country obtain protection in other countries for their intellectual 
creations in the form of industrial property rights,” including patents, trademarks, and 
industrial designs.74 The Paris Convention was ratified in 1883 and first went into effect 
 
In each of the contracting countries the following 
shall not be considered as infringing the rights of the 
patentee: 
 (1)  The use on board ships of other Unionist 
countries of anything the subject matter of his patent in the 
body of the ship, in the machinery, tackle, apparatus, and 
other accessories when such ships enter temporarily or 
accidentally the waters of the country, provided that such 
thing is employed there exclusively for the needs of the 
vessel. 
 (2)  The use of anything the subject matter of the 
patent in the construction or functioning of the engines of 
locomotion for air or land of the other Unionist countries, 
or of the accessories of these engines, when these enter the 
country temporarily or accidentally. 
Protection of Industrial Property:  Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting Certified Copy of a Convention Signed at the Hague on November 6, 1925, 
by the Plenipotentiaries of the United States and of the Other Governments Members of 
the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, Modifying the 
International Convention of March 20, 1883, Revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, 
and at Washington on June 2, 1911, at 9 (1930) [hereinafter Original Article 5ter]. 
74 World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties and Contracting Parties:  
General Information, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited Aug. 14, 
2005). 
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in 1883 with fourteen signatory nations.75 Since then, the Paris Convention has been 
revised several times, with the last revision in Stockholm in 1967.76 As of January 2005, 
the Paris Convention had 169 signatory nations.77 
The current version of the temporary-presence provision of Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention provides: 
 In any country of the Union the following shall not 
be considered as infringements of the rights of a patentee: 
 1. the use on board vessels of other countries 
of the Union of devices forming the subject of his patent in 
the body of the vessel, in the machinery, tackle, gear and 
other accessories, when such vessels temporarily or 
accidentally enter the waters of the said country, provided 
that such devices are used there exclusively for the needs of 
the vessel; 
 2. the use of devices forming the subject of the 
patent in the construction or operation of aircraft or land 
vehicles of other countries of the Union, or of accessories 
of such aircraft or land vehicles, when those aircraft or land 
vehicles temporarily or accidentally enter the said 
country.78 
75 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE 241 (2d ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/. 
76 Id. at 241-42. 
77 World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/d-paris.pdf, at 7 
(last updated January 3, 2005). 
78 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5ter, opened for 
signature Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, as revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
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The first paragraph of Article 5ter relates to the use of patented inventions on ships; the 
second paragraph relates to aircraft and land vehicles.79 Overall, the requirements of 
Article 5ter are quite similar to those of § 272:  (1) vessel, aircraft, or vehicle; (2) 
reciprocity; (3) temporary or accidental presence; and (4) exclusively for the needs of the 
vehicle.80 However, Article 5ter and § 272 differ in that unlike § 272, Article 5ter has no 
restriction on domestic sales or manufacturing activity.81 Since its adoption, Article 5ter 
has led to temporary-presence statutes in many countries, including the United States.82 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention art. 5ter].  The changes in Article 
5ter from the original 1925 version to today’s version do not appear to be substantive.  
Compare Original Article 5ter, supra note 73, with Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra.
79 See Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78; see also LADAS, supra note 6, at 
247. 
80 Compare Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78, with 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
81 Compare Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78, with § 272.
82 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000); Patents Act, 1990, § 118 (Austl.); Patent Act, 
R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 23 (Can.); Patenttilaki [Patents Act], No. 550 of Dec. 15, 1967, as last 
amended by Act No. 243 of Mar. 21, 1997, § 5 (Fin.); Patentgesetz [Patent Law], Dec. 
16, 1980, as last amended by the Laws of July 16 and August 6, 1998, § 11(4)-(6) 
(F.R.G.); Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 49 (India); Patents Act, 1992, § 42(d)-(e) (Ir.) 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992_1.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2005); 
Patents Law, 5727-1967, § 181 (Isr.); The Industrial Property Act, (1989) Cap. 509 
§ 38(3) (Kenya); Rijksoctrooiwet [Patents Act], art. 54 (Neth.); The Patents Act 1953, 
§ 79 (N.Z.); Ley No. 354, Sep. 19, 2000, Ley de Patentes de Invención, Modelo de 
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D. CONGRESS ENACTS SECTION 272 
The holding in Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention led to the 
enactment of the U.S. temporary-presence-defense statute, 35 U.S.C. § 272, as part of the 
Patent Act of 1952.83 Section 272 has only two brief pieces of legislative history.84 The 
 
Utilidad y Diseños Industriales [Law of Patents, Utility Models, and Industrial Designs], 
§ 46(b) (Nicar.); Lov om patenter [Patents Act], Act No. 9 of Dec. 15, 1967, as last 
amended by Act No. 104 of Dec. 20, 1996, § 5 (Nor.); Ustawa O Wynalazczosci [Law on 
Inventive Activity], Oct. 19, 1972, as amended by the Law of Apr. 16, 1993, art. 15(5) 
(Pol.); Estatuto de la Propiedad Industrial [Industrial Property Code], Royal Decree-Law 
of July 26, 1929, as last amended by Law No. 17/1975 of May 2, 1975, § 52 (Spain); Loi 
Fédérale Sur les Brevets d’Invention [LBI] [Federal Law on Patents for Inventions], June 
25, 1954, as last amended on Mar. 24, 1995, art. 35(3) (Switz.); Patents Act, 1977, § 60 
(U.K.); Patents Act, 1971, as last amended by Act 20/1994 (s. 7), Ch. 26:03, § 81 
(Zimb.). 
83 See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9, 28 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2402, 2422.  Section 272 was amended once in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 272 (2000)).  The purpose of this Act was to “implement the trade agreements 
concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations,” which were 
“conducted under the auspices of the GATT” (i.e., the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade).  S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 1-2 (1994).  Among other things, the patent provisions 
of this Act “amend[ed] the definition of infringing activity to include offers for sale.”  Id. 
at 10.  Thus, the Act amended § 272 to correspond to this change in the definition of 
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first piece of legislative history reads:  “Section 272 is a new section in the law relating to 
infringement, but it is of relatively little importance and it follows a paragraph in a treaty 
to which the United States is a party.”85 The second piece of legislative history reads:  
“This section follows the requirement of the International Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, to which the United States is a party, and also codifies the holding 
 
infringing activity by eliminating the phrase “not sold” and replacing it with “not offered 
for sale or sold.”  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §  272 (2000)); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 512 (1994). 
84 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004).  Although it is not actual legislative history, it is informative that P.J. 
Federico, one of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952, described § 272 as follows: 
Section 272, which is new, providing that use of a patented 
invention in a vessel, aircraft or vehicle of a foreign 
country temporarily in the United States shall not constitute 
infringement, follows a provision in the International 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to 
which the United States is a party, and also codifies a 
holding of the Supreme Court that use of a patented 
invention on board a foreign ship does not infringe a patent.  
The general definition of vessel and vehicle in 1 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3 and 4 would be applicable here. 
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1954), 
reprinted in 75 J. PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE SOCIETY 161, 214 (1993).  The Federal 
Circuit recently relied on this commentary in interpreting the term “vehicle” in § 272.  
NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328; see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the term “vehicle” in § 272). 
85 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2402. 
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of the Supreme Court that use of a patented invention on board a foreign ship does not 
infringe a patent.”86 
It is unfortunate that Congress chose to describe § 272 as “of relatively little 
importance.”87 Although the revision to § 272 may have been less important than the 
other major revisions encompassed within the Patent Act of 1952,88 § 272 nonetheless 
 
86 Id. at 28, as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2422.  In this legislative history, 
the phrase “the requirement of the International Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, to which the United States is a party” refers to Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention.  See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1326.  Moreover, “the holding of the Supreme 
Court” to which the legislative history refers is that of Brown v. Duchesne. See id.; Cali 
v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“It will be seen that 
Brown v. Duchesne is to some extent the source of the ideas and language in Section 272 
. . . .”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. 
Cl. 197, 231 (1993). 
Article 5ter itself has no force of law because the Paris Convention is not self-
executing.  In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Kawai v. 
Metlestics, 480 F.2d 880, 884 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).  As such, it was necessary for Congress 
to enact § 272.  See id. at 1209 (holding that the Paris Convention had “no direct effect 
until implemented by domestic law”). 
87 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2402. 
88 The 1952 Patent Act was a major amendment to the existing patent statutes, 
completely rewriting the patent statutes “[f]or the first time since 1879.”  Federico, supra 
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remains an important defense to accused infringers under the appropriate 
circumstances.89 Indeed, according to the district court in Cali, the “adoption [of § 272] 
implies that [this provision was] understood to create a useful immunity from 
infringement liability that was of enough importance to occupy the attention of the 
Congress and the negotiators of two treaties.”90 Moreover, the temporary-presence 
defense of § 272 should become even more important as commerce continues to become 
more global.91 Since its enactment in 1952, U.S. courts have applied § 272 several times. 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 272 AND THE 
TEMPORARY-PRESENCE DEFENSE BEFORE NATIONAL STEEL CAR 
This Part discusses cases interpreting § 272 and the temporary-presence defense 
before National Steel Car. As discussed below, the case law applying § 272 up to and 
including National Steel Car shows the variety of means of transportation to which § 272 
can apply—namely airplanes, spacecraft, “roll trailers,” ferry boats, and rail cars.    This 
case law includes two U.S. cases interpreting § 272, as well as foreign cases of interest 
interpreting temporary-presence-defense statutes analogous to § 272.  Part II.A examines 
 
note 84, at 163.  The Act had two purposes:  (1) to substantively change some of the 
existing patent law and (2) to codify the existing patent statutes and some case law.  Id. at 
170. 
89 See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1325-34; Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124-28; Hughes 
Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 240-41. 
90 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126. 
91 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the 
temporary-presence defense in today’s global economy). 
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Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc.,92 in which a district court in 1974 held that § 272 provided a 
complete defense to patent infringement for aircraft that were temporarily present in the 
United States.  Next, Part II.B discusses Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,93 in which 
the United States Court of Federal Claims in 1993 held that § 272 provided a patent-
infringement defense for certain spacecraft.  Finally, Part II.C considers two foreign cases 
of interest—one from Germany and one from the United Kingdom. 
A. CALI V. JAPAN AIRLINES, INC.
The first case to interpret § 272 was Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc.,94 in which the 
meaning of “entering the United States temporarily” was at issue.95 In Cali, a patentee 
sued three foreign airlines for infringement of a patent covering a modification to a jet 
 
92 380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975). 
93 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993). 
94 Cali, 380 F. Supp. 1120. 
95 Id. at 1124.  No other elements of § 272 were at issue in Cali. The accused 
aircraft in question were clearly aircraft of other countries that provided reciprocal 
temporary-presence privileges.  See id. at 1127.  Additionally, the parties did not dispute 
that the accused engines were used exclusively for the needs of the aircraft.  See id. at 
1122.  Finally, there was no allegation that the accused engines were “offered for sale or 
sold in or used for the manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the United 
States.”  § 272; see Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1122. 
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engine.96 The patentee claimed that these airlines infringed the patent by using the 
engines in regularly scheduled flights into, out of, and over the United States.97 Indeed, 
the court characterized these flights as “regular, of very considerable extent, long 
continued, and supported by ground service, marketing facilities, etc.”98 The patentee 
argued that § 272 should not provide the accused infringers with an infringement defense 
because:  (1) the accused aircraft were not “temporarily” present in the United States 
under a proper interpretation of § 272 and (2) § 272 was unconstitutional.99 The court 
rejected both these arguments and held that § 272 and Article 5ter of the Paris 
 
96 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1122 (citing Axial Flow Compressors for Jet Engines, 
U.S. Patent No. 3,265,290 (filed Sept. 1, 1964)).  In an earlier decision in the same case, 
the Second Circuit described the patentee and his invention as follows: 
 Cali . . . is a mechanic employed by one of the 
pioneers in the airlines industry, Pan American World 
Airways (Pan Am).  The kernel of the patented invention 
which is the subject of this suit was contained in an idea 
which Cali submitted to Pan Am on a standard form 
soliciting employees’ suggestions in December 1962. . . . 
Cali’s proposal apparently resulted in the correction of a 
persistent defect in the design of the JT-4 jet engine, then 
used in Pan Am’s Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 aircraft 
before the introduction of the fan jet.  Cali’s ‘suggestion-
box’ solution had eluded the industry’s professional 
engineers. 
Cali v. E. Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 1971) (reversing grant of summary 
judgment in favor of accused infringer for invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) based on 
alleged public use). 
97 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1122.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1123-24. 
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Convention100 provided the airlines with “a complete defense to the claims against them 
for patent infringement.”101 The court held that “temporarily” means no “less than 
 
100 The court also relied on Article 27 of the Chicago Convention on International 
Civil Aviation of 1944.  See id. at 1123-24, 1126-28.  Article 27, entitled “Exemption 
from seizure on patent claims,” provides for a temporary-presence defense to patent 
infringement for aircraft: 
 (a) While engaged in international air navigation, 
any authorized entry of aircraft of a contracting State into 
the territory of another contracting State or authorized 
transit across the territory of such State with or without 
landings shall not entail any seizure or detention of the 
aircraft or any claim against the owner or operator thereof 
or any other interference therewith by or on behalf of such 
State or any person therein, on the ground that the 
construction, mechanism, parts, accessories or operation of 
the aircraft is an infringement of any patent, design, or 
model duly granted or registered in the State whose 
territory is entered by the aircraft, it being agreed that no 
deposit of security in connection with the foregoing 
exemption from seizure or detention of the aircraft shall in 
any case be required in the State entered by such aircraft. 
 (b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article 
shall also be applicable to the storage of spare parts and 
spare equipment for the aircraft and the right to use and 
install the same in the repair of an aircraft of a contracting 
State in the territory of any other contracting State, 
provided that any patented part or equipment so stored shall 
not be sold or distributed internally in or exported 
commercially from the contracting State entered by the 
aircraft. 
 (c) The benefits of this Article shall apply only to 
such States, parties to this Convention, as either (1) are 
parties to the International Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property and to any amendments thereof; or (2) 
have enacted patent laws which recognize and give 
adequate protection to inventions made by the nationals of 
the other States parties to this Convention. 
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entering for the purpose of completing a voyage, turning about, and continuing or 
commencing a new voyage,”102 and that § 272 was not unconstitutional.103 
The patentee first argued that § 272 should not apply because the accused 
aircraft would not be “temporarily” present in the United States.104 The patentee 
contended that § 272 “cannot be taken to cover the maintenance of a regular and 
systematic international aircraft service to the United states [sic], including overflights of 
it.”105 The court disagreed.  The court began by looking at the Supreme Court’s holding 
 
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 27, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295.  The scope of the Chicago Convention is broader than that of § 272 
because it “allow[s] the ‘storage of spare parts and spare equipment for the aircraft’ in the 
domestic country.”  5 CHISUM, supra note 52, § 16.05[4], at 16-247 n.12. 
101 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124.  To the extent that the court relied directly on 
Article 5ter as a source of law, rather than just § 272, the court was incorrect because the 
Paris Convention is not self-executing.  In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (citing Kawai v. Metlestics, 480 F.2d 880, 884 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
The procedural posture of Cali was that the patentee had moved “for summary 
judgment in substance striking the defenses based on Section 272.”  Id. at 1128.  The 
court denied the patentee’s motion.  Id. 
102 Id. at 1126. 
103 Id. at 1127-28. 
104 Id. at 1124. 
105 Id. 
37 
in Brown v. Duchesne.106 The court observed that Brown “means at a minimum that the 
patent law must not be so interpreted as to impair the treaty-making capacity of the nation 
or to clog its power to regulate foreign commerce.”107 The court further reasoned that the 
holding of Brown “does not mean . . . that only trivial uses” fall under § 272, even though 
“[t]he [Supreme] Court emphasized the ‘no damage’ aspect in reaching its conclusion.”108 
Additionally, the court looked to the negotiating history of Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention for insight into the meaning of “temporarily.”109 The court observed that a 
committee considering the adoption of Article 5ter at the Hague Conference discussed the 
meaning of “temporarily.”110 According to the court, “the committee indicated that the 
words ‘temporarily’ and ‘accidentally’ were chosen to cover entries into port for more or 
 
106 Id. at 1124-26 (discussing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856)).  
For a discussion of Brown, see supra Part I.B. 
107 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1125-26. 
108 Id. at 1126. 
109 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124.  The court relied on the negotiating history of this 
treaty provision in interpreting § 272 because 
the United States has in substance so interpreted its own 
patent laws in unhesitatingly becoming a party to the Paris 
Convention and the Chicago Convention, both of which 
specifically deal with the very subject matter of Brown v. 
Duchesne and Section 272, and do so in an historical 
evolution which furnishes an insight into the meaning of 
the word ‘temporarily’ as used in the phrase ‘entering the 
United States temporarily or accidentally.’ 
Id. at 1126. 
110 Id. 
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less brief periods whether periodically or exceptionally and whether unintentionally or 
not.”111 
Thus, the court concluded that “‘[t]emporarily’ . . . could not sensibly mean any 
less than entering for the purpose of completing a voyage, turning about, and continuing 
or commencing a new voyage.”112 The court reasoned: 
 The enactment of Section 272 and the adoption of 
Article 5ter would be incomprehensible if they were 
intended to cover only trivia.  Their adoption implies that 
they were understood to create a useful immunity from 
infringement liability that was of enough importance to 
occupy the attention of the Congress and the negotiators of 
two treaties.  Their language was chosen to deal with an 
internationally significant matter arising in a world in 
which scheduled freight and passenger services by 
established international carriers by air and sea were likely 
to require such an immunity to cover countless articles 
aboard aircraft or vessels that could turn out to be covered 
by patents in the United States that were without 
counterpart abroad.  It is difficult to see any other purpose 
in Section 272 and Article 5ter than to meet the needs and 
realities of international trade and navigation.113 
The court then drew an important distinction between domestic and international 
traffic: 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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The distinction would be between a Caravelle,114 
manufactured in France and powered with such an engine, 
delivered here for use by an airline in this country for 
domestic traffic, even though manufactured and sold in 
France, and a foreign aircraft arriving here on an 
international flight only to unload, turn about, reload and 
depart.115 
The court concluded that the travels of the accused aircraft were international, rather than 
domestic, in character.116 Therefore, the accused aircraft were “temporarily” present in 
the United States and covered by § 272.117 
The court also considered and rejected the patentee’s argument that § 272 is 
unconstitutional.118 Specifically, the patentee argued “that if an invention is patentable, 
the Government [sic] is constitutionally precluded from according the inventor anything 
less than the exclusive grant described in the Constitution and provided for in” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154.119 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the Patent Clause “is not self-
 
114 The Caravelle was “[a] highly successful French-built medium-range airliner, 
[which] was one of the first commercial aircraft to place its two jet engines at the tail.”  
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AVIATION 42 (1977).  The Caravelle made its first flight in 1955 and 
entered regular service in 1959.  Id. 
115 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126. 
116 See id. at 1124. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 1123-25, 1127-28. 
119 Id. at 1123-24.  Section 154 provides, in relevant part:  “Every patent shall 
contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using, 
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executing.”120 The court observed that the Patent Clause “empowers but does not 
command the Congress to grant patent rights, and the source of any specific right is the 
statute which defines the nature and extent of the patent right granted.”121 The court then 
noted that under Supreme Court precedent, “Congress having created the monopoly, may 
put such limitations upon it as it pleases.”122 Thus, § 272 merely represents a permissible 
limitation on the patent monopoly.123 
The patentee also argued that the application of § 272 and Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention amounted to an unconstitutional taking.124 However, the court rejected this 
argument.125 The court reasoned: 
Whatever might have been the case as to patents granted 
before Brown v. Duchesne, it has not been the case as to 
patents granted since the expiration of the patents then 
extant.  All such later patents have Brown v. Duchesne read 
into them. . . . The enactment of the patent law under the 
constitutional provision simply was not a compact with all 
future inventors never to make such treaties as the Paris and 
Chicago Conventions and never to add a Section 272 to the 
patent laws.  That is what Brown v. Duchesne decided in 
pointing out that the patent law must not be interpreted to 
 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the 
invention into the United States . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000). 
120 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. (quoting Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900)). 
123 See id. 
124 Id. at 1127. 
125 Id. at 1127-28. 
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abridge the nation’s capacity to carry on its treaty-making 
powers and its power to regulate foreign commerce.126 
Thus, because the patent in suit was issued in 1966, after the enactment of § 272, Article 
5ter of the Paris Convention, and Article 27 of the Chicago Convention, the court 
reasoned that these provisions “were integral limitations on the [patent] grant.”127 
Therefore, the court ultimately concluded 
that the statute, Section 272, and the Paris Convention, 
Article 5ter, cannot be so narrowly interpreted as [the 
patentee] contends, and that Article 27 of the Chicago 
Convention, Article 5ter, of the Paris Convention, and 
Section 272, are constitutionally valid as applied to the 
[accused infringers’] uses of [the patentee’s] patented 
engines, and, therefore, accord [the accused infringers] a 
complete defense to the claims against them for patent 
infringement.128 
The Second Circuit subsequently affirmed this decision without an opinion.129 
B. HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. V. UNITED STATES 
The second case interpreting § 272 before National Steel Car was Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States.130 In Hughes Aircraft, the Court of Federal Claims held 
that the temporary-presence defense of § 272 did not apply to spacecraft launched before 
 
126 Id. at 1128. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1124. 
129 See Cali v. Japan Airlines Co., 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975) (unpublished 
table decision). 
130 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993). 
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1981, but that § 272 did cover the launch of certain spacecraft after 1981.131 The reason 
for the distinction between launches before and after 1981 was that in 1981, Congress 
passed a statute that brought spacecraft within the definition of “vehicle” for purposes of 
the § 272 temporary-presence defense.132 This statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k), reads:  “Any 
object intended for launch, launched, or assembled in outer space shall be considered a 
vehicle for the purpose of section 272 of Title 35.”133 
Hughes Aircraft involved a patent covering “an apparatus for controlling the 
attitude of a spin-stabilized spacecraft.”134 The patentee sought compensation from the 
United States for its alleged use of the patented invention in numerous spacecraft.135 Five 
 
131 Id. at 231-33, 240-41. 
132 Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 232; see National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-96, 95 Stat. 1207. 
133 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k) (2000).  Section 2457 is entitled “Property rights in 
inventions.”  § 2457. 
134 Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 201 (citing Velocity Control and Orientation of 
a Spin-Stabilized Body, U.S. Patent No. 3,758,051 (filed Aug. 21, 1964)). 
135 Id. The patentee sought “compensation in excess of four billion dollars” from 
the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.  Id. This statute provides, in relevant part: 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a 
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or 
for the United States without license of the owner thereof 
or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s 
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the 
United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of 
his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and 
manufacture. 
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of the spacecraft at issue in Hughes Aircraft were developed in partnership with other 
nations, such as West Germany and the United Kingdom.136 Before launch in the United 
States, each of these spacecraft “was manufactured in another country and funded by 
another nation.”137 In addition to advancing other defenses, the United States contended 
that 35 U.S.C. § 272 provided a complete defense for any use of the patented invention 
because the spacecraft at issue would be only temporarily present in the United States.138 
The court first considered whether § 272 applied to spacecraft launched before 
1981.139 The patentee argued that such pre-1981 launches should not fall under § 272 
because before the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k), spacecraft “were not vessels, 
aircraft or vehicles.”140 The court agreed, reasoning that in the absence of § 2457(k), 
“such spacecraft would properly be deemed cargo brought to this country for use (i.e., 
launch), not a vehicle or vessel within the contemplation of the temporary presence 
doctrine.”141 The court noted that spacecraft did not fit under the definition of “vessel” or 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).  “The theoretical basis for [a] recovery [under § 1498] is the 
doctrine of eminent domain.  In this context, the United States is not in the position of an 
ordinary infringer, but rather a compulsory, nonexclusive licensee.”  Motorola, Inc. v. 
United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 
136 See Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 224-25, 237-39. 
137 Id. at 225. 
138 Id. at 231. 
139 Id. at 231-33. 
140 Id. at 232. 
141 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
44 
“vehicle” provided in 1 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4.142 The court then distinguished Brown143 and 
Cali,144 observing that: 
In those cases, the entries of the vessels and aircraft 
(operating as means of conveyance) were for purposes of 
depositing cargo and passengers and initiating new trips 
elsewhere.   When a spacecraft is delivered to the United 
States for the purpose of allowing the United States to 
launch it, the spacecraft is the cargo brought here for an 
essential use, not a “vessel” or “vehicle” which enters the 
United States as a means of conveyance.145 
Thus, the court held that § 272 cannot apply to spacecraft launched before 1981.146 
The court also considered whether § 272 applied to a certain spacecraft launched 
after 1981.147 The court held that § 272 did provide the United States with a defense with 
 
142 Id. at 232 n.46.  The definition of “vessel” under § 3 “includes every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as 
a means of transportation on water.”  1 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).  The definition of “vehicle” 
under § 4 “includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or 
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land.”  1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).  These 
provisions are a part of the Dictionary Act.  See infra note 301 (discussing the Dictionary 
Act). 
143 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856). 
144 Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d,
535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975). 
145 Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 232. 
146 Id. at 232-33. 
147 Id. at 240-41. 
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respect to the launch of this spacecraft.148 First, the court concluded that the spacecraft 
had to qualify as a “vehicle” under § 272 due to the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k).149 
Second, the court held that the spacecraft was “temporarily” present in the United States 
because the spacecraft “entered the United States one time for the sole purpose of being 
launched into outer space.”150 Third, the court observed that “the United Kingdom 
extends ‘similar privileges’ to ‘vessels, aircraft and vehicles’ of the United States.”151 
Finally, the court held that “[t]here can be no dispute” that “[t]he invention—the attitude 
control system—was used exclusively for the needs of the vehicle, and the invention was 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 240. 
150 Id. The court looked to Cali and reasoned that if the systematic presence of 
the aircraft in Cali was temporary, then the presence of a spacecraft “in the United States 
one time for a short duration” must also be temporary.  Id. (citing Cali v. Japan Airlines, 
Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
151 Id. The court rejected the patentee’s argument “that the doctrine does not 
apply because the United Kingdom does not have a statute making the temporary 
presence doctrine applicable to spacecraft.”  Id. n.67.  The court reasoned: 
Section 272 does not require that the United Kingdom and 
the United States have identical temporary presence 
doctrines—only that the United Kingdom have a doctrine 
relating to “vessels, aircraft and vehicles.”  Further, 
defendant’s expert witness on United Kingdom law 
testified that the United Kingdom would apply its doctrine 
to a United States spacecraft entering the United Kingdom 
temporarily. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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not sold or used for manufacture within the United States.”152 Therefore, the court 
concluded that for the spacecraft launched after 1981, § 272 provided the United States 
with a complete defense to infringement.153 
152 Id. at 241.  The patentee also argued that an additional condition should be 
read into § 272—”that the use of the invention be solely by another country and that the 
use be of no benefit to the United States.”  Id. at 240 n.66.  However, the court rejected 
this argument as unpersuasive because the argument was “based on the legislative history 
of another provision—42 U.S.C. § 2457(l).”  Id. 
153 Id. Interestingly, the temporary-presence doctrine as applied to spacecraft also 
appeared in an intergovernmental agreement (“IGA”) concerning the international space 
station Freedom. Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, 
Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of 
Japan, and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, 
Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station 
art. 21(6), Sept. 29, 1988, State Dept. No. 92-65, KAV No. 2382, available at 1992 WL 
466295 [hereinafter Space Station IGA]; see Leo B. Malagar & Marlo Apalisok 
Magdoza-Malagar, International Law of Outer Space and the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 311, 363 n.260 (1999); Arnold Vahrenwald, 
Intellectual Property on the Space Station “Freedom,” 1993 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
318, 323-24.  The stated object of this IGA was “to establish a long-term international 
cooperative framework among the Partners . . . for the detailed design, development, 
operation, and utilization of a permanently manned civil Space Station for peaceful 
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C. FOREIGN CASES 
Temporary-presence-defense statutes analogous to § 272 exist in many 
countries.154 It is interesting to look to the interpretation that foreign courts have given to 
these counterpart temporary-presence provisions, particularly because such statutes are 
often based on Article 5ter of the Paris Convention—the same treaty provision that 
underlies § 272.155 In particular, two cases are notable.  Part II.C.1 discusses the first 
 
purposes, in accordance with international law.”  Space Station IGA, supra, art. 1(1).  
Article 21(6) of the IGA provides: 
The temporary presence in the territory of a Partner State of 
any articles, including the components of a flight element, 
in transit between any place on Earth and any flight 
element of the Space Station registered by another Partner 
State or ESA shall not in itself form the basis for any 
proceedings in the first Partner State for patent 
infringement. 
Id. art. 21(6).  “[I]t was the purpose of this provision to exclude that the transport of 
payloads or flight elements of the European partner by US launchers could infringe US 
patents—a particular concern to the European partner who will be dependent on US 
launchers for some time.”  Vahrenwald, supra, at 323.  This “IGA was superseded in 
1998 by the Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement.”  Malagar, supra, at 363 n.262 
(citing 1998 U.S. Treaty Actions, 37 I.L.M. 1495 (1998)). 
154 For examples of such provisions, see supra note 82. 
155 Cf. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (looking to U.K. case law to determine whether a provision of U.S. patent law 
conformed to an international agreement); Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd., [2003] 
EWCA (Civ) 66, [67] (Eng.) (Munby, J.) (“I am glad to think that on a point arising in 
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such case, Rolltrailer,156 in which a German court in 1973 held that the German 
temporary-presence statute protected vehicles called “roll trailers” from infringement 
liability.  Next, Part II.C.2 discusses Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd.,157 in which an 
English court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute exempted certain ferries from 
infringement. 
1. Germany:  Rolltrailer 
In 1973 in Rolltrailer,158 a West German court held that its temporary-presence 
statute provided a defense to infringement.159 The patent at issue in Rolltrailer covered 
couplings used in conjunction with roll trailers, which “are used to transport containers 
. . . onto ships.”160 The court described roll trailers as follows: 
 
this area of the law, relating to international commerce, whether by sea or in the air, and 
founded moreover on an international Convention, the courts of this country should feel 
able to come to precisely the same essential conclusion as courts in Germany and the 
United States.”). 
156 LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.). 
157 [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.).   
158 LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.), translated in Brief 
for Defendants-Appellants at B6-B13, Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC 
II), 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1256) [hereinafter Rolltrailer Translation]. 
159 Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B13. 
160 Id. at B6 (citing German Patent No. 1,297,999 (published Mar. 26, 1970) and 
German Utility Model No. 1,968,449). 
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They are loaded with the goods for transportation in the 
departure dock, pulled onto the ship thus laden and parked 
there for the journey.  At the arrival dock they are unloaded 
onto the quayside with their load where they are unloaded.  
Having been loaded again they can then be used for 
transportation on another ship.  All in all, they serve to 
facilitate and speed up the transportation of goods and to 
shorten the time the ships spend in harbour.161 
Roll trailers have no means for self-propulsion; instead, they are pulled by tractors.162 
The accused infringer was a Finnish shipping company that regularly brought roll trailers 
allegedly using the patented invention into Germany on German ships, used the roll 
trailers to unload and load cargo, then exited Germany with the roll trailers on the 
ships.163 The accused infringer asserted a defense under the German temporary-presence 
statute.164 According to the court, pursuant to that statute, “the effect of a German patent 
does not extend to equipment on vehicles which enter the country only temporarily.”165 
161 Id.; see also SDV  Oilfield, Glossary of International Trade Terms, 
http://www.sdvoilfield.com/genst.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2005) (“[‘Roll trailer’ is a] 
generic term for a wheeled trailer used for carrying cargo, also known as a mafi.  It may 
remain on board throughout ocean passage or be used as a ‘slave’ trailer to transport 
cargo to and from the vessel once on quay.  It has an under layer with a steel chassis and 
equipped with solid rubber tyres.  It is attached to a tug master with a gooseneck.”). 
162 See Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B6-B7. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at B7.  
165 Id. at B8.  At the time, this statute had not been amended to conform to Article 
5ter of the Paris Convention.  See Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd., [2003] EWCA 
(Civ) 66, [35] (Eng.) (commenting on the Rolltrailer case). 
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At issue was whether the roll trailers in question were vehicles under the statute, whether 
they were of another country, and whether they were temporarily present in Germany.166 
The court held that roll trailers are vehicles.167 The court relied on a broad 
definition of “vehicle” from German case law:  “a vehicle is ‘any object which is 
arranged to travel on the earth, in water or in the air, either in the manner of one of the 
known transporting means or in some other manner, and in the use of which the 
movement plays an essential part.’”168 The court also discussed even broader definitions 
of “vehicle” from the literature.169 The court found that roll trailers meet these 
definitions of “vehicle.”170 Even though roll trailers themselves have no means for 
 
166 See Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B8-B13. 
167 See id. at B8-B10. 
168 Id. at B9.  This definition includes ships and aircraft as being “vehicles”.  See 
id. Thus, this definition is broader than the U.S. statutory definition of “vehicle,” which 
includes only land vehicles.  Compare id., with 1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (“The word ‘vehicle’ 
includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of 
being used, as a means of transportation on land.” (emphasis added)). 
169 Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B9.  One such definition “state[d] 
that the only essential feature [of a ‘vehicle’] is ‘the ability to travel in space.’”  Id. The 
court also noted that “[t]here is general consent in the literature that all types of vehicles, 
without any distinctions, are to be regarded as vehicles in the sense of” the temporary-
presence statute.  Id. The court also noted “that it does not matter whether the vehicle is 
used for carrying people or objects.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
170 Id. 
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propulsion, the court still found that roll trailers are vehicles, noting that according to the 
literature, “it is not crucial how the vehicle moves and whether it has its own driving 
force.”171 The court also rejected the argument that roll trailers are not vehicles because 
they entered the country on ships “without performing [their] natural function as 
transporting means.”172 The court emphasized that “[t]he only important point is that the 
vehicles are used as such in the country.”173 The court justified its broad interpretation of 
“vehicle” with the policy behind the temporary-presence defense:  “The imposition of 
any more stringent demands is forbidden . . . by the sense and purpose of the provision[], 
which is to promote free international trade.”174 
The court next considered whether the roll trailers were of another country.175 
The patentee argued that the roll trailers were not of another country because the accused 
infringer used them on German ships owned by third parties, rather than on foreign 
ships.176 The court rejected this argument, stating that “[t]he prerequisite for satisfying 
this condition of the application of [the temporary-presence statute] is that the vehicle is 
 
171 Id. 
172 Id. The court noted that “[v]ehicles which enter the country, for example on a 
railway truck or ship, are also covered by” the temporary-presence statute.  Id. 
173 Id. at B10. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at B10-B12. 
176 See id. The patentee argued that the roll trailers “take the nationality of the 
ships on which they were carried.”  Id. at B11. 
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based in another country.”177 The court found that the roll trailers were, indeed, based in 
Finland.178 The court again found support for its broad interpretation from the policy 
behind the temporary-presence defense: 
[O]ne major consideration is that the terms of [the 
temporary-presence statute] are . . . designed to promote 
trade wherever possible and must be adapted to the 
constantly altering circumstances of international transport 
in a progressive manner.  However, this principle would be 
infringed if in determining the home of the roll[] trailers 
used by the defendant a decision were based on the ships 
which carry them.  The result of this would be to force the 
[accused infringers], through German patent law, to refrain 
from using German ships, irrespective of the increasing 
cooperation and interdependency of international transport.  
The freedom of international trade would thus be seriously 
jeopardised, contrary to the spirit and intention of [the 
temporary-presence statute].179 
Thus, the court concluded that the roll trailers were vehicles of another country.180 
Finally, the court considered whether the roll trailers were only temporarily 
present in Germany.181 The court found that the roll trailers were temporarily present 
 
177 Id. at B10. 
178 Id. at B11.  The court reasoned as follows: 
 The [accused infringer] obtained the roll[] trailers 
from a manufacturer in Finland and brought them from 
Finland for their own purposes.  Irrespective of their use on 
ships owned by third parties these roller trailers continue to 
be their property and are administered and managed from 
Finland, the country in which the [accused infringer’s] 
business is based.  They are accordingly based in Finland. 
Id. 
179 Id. at B11-B12 (citations omitted). 
180 Id. at B11. 
181 Id. at B12-B13. 
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despite “[t]he fact that the roll[] trailers enter Germany regularly and repeatedly.”182 
Without explicitly defining “temporarily” as used in the statute, the court’s reasoning as 
to the meaning of “temporarily” was time-based.183 The court observed that “after this 
stay, as envisaged from the outset, [the roll trailers] leave Germany again after a 
relatively short period.”184 The court then speculated that “a stay in the country can only 
be regarded as no longer temporary if it lasts for at least several months in one go.”185 
The court also rejected the argument that the roll trailers were not temporarily present 
because a number of the accused infringer’s roll trailers might always be present in 
Germany.186 The court reasoned that “[a]s the subject of the patent infringement is only 
the individual roll[] trailer, the only important point is whether the individual roll[] trailer 
is only temporarily in the country.”187 Again, the court supported its conclusion with the 
policy behind the temporary-presence defense:  “This [interpretation] corresponds to the 
purposes of [the temporary presence statute], which is intended to protect international 
 
182 Id. at B12. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. The court found that “this does not appear to be the case here, as indicated 
by the purpose and function of the roll[] trailers and the rapidity of modern day sea 
travel.”  Id. 
186 Id. at B12-B13. 
187 Id. at B13. 
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transport trade from claims arising from patents.  Meanspiritedness is not compatible 
with this concept.”188 
Therefore, for these reasons, the court dismissed the patentee’s complaint, holding 
that the temporary-presence statute provided the accused infringer with a complete 
defense.189 
2. United Kingdom:  Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. 
Another interesting foreign case is Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd.,190 in 
which the English Court of Appeal in 2003 held that the U.K. temporary-presence 
defense applied to a ferry boat that traveled regularly between Ireland and Wales.191 The 
U.K. temporary-presence defense is contained in section 60 of the Patents Act of 1977.192 
This statute provides, in relevant part: 
(5) An act which, apart from this subsection, would 
constitute an infringement of a patent for an invention shall 
not do so if— 
 . . . . 
 
188 Id. at B12. 
189 Id. at B13. 
190 Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 
(Eng.), aff’g [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737 (Eng.).   
191 Id. at [12]-[38].  The Irish Ferries case was the first case in which a U.K. court 
interpreted the phrase “temporarily or accidentally” in the U.K. temporary-presence-
defense statute.  Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 430 n.2.  
192 Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [12]. 
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 (d) it consists of the use, exclusively for the needs 
of a relevant ship, of a product or process in the body of 
such a ship or in its machinery, tackle, apparatus or other 
accessories, in a case where the ship has temporarily or 
accidentally entered the internal or territorial waters of the 
United Kingdom . . . .
. . . .
(7) In this section— 
 “relevant ship” and “relevant aircraft, hovercraft or 
vehicle” mean respectively a ship and an aircraft, 
hovercraft or vehicle registered in, or belonging to, any 
country, other than the United Kingdom, which is a party to 
the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
signed at Paris on 20th March 1883 or which is a member 
of the World Trade Organisation . . . .193 
The patent at issue in Irish Ferries was for a “multi-hull vessel of the catamaran 
type which has two or more hulls connected by means of one or more decks and an 
overlying superstructure.”194 The accused infringer allegedly employed this patented 
invention in its catamaran, the Jonathan Swift, that operated between Dublin, Ireland and 
Holyhead, Wales.195 The court described the use of the catamaran by the accused 
infringer as follows:  “The Jonathan Swift is a ferry registered in Eire which sails 
 
193 Patents Act, 1977, § 60 (U.K.).  The U.K. temporary-presence statute also 
includes provisions for land vehicles and aircraft.  Id. The language of the U.K. 
temporary-presence statute is similar to that of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention.  
Compare id., with Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78. 
194 Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [4]; see also id. at [1] (citing 
Superstructure for Multihull Vessels, European Patent (U.K.) No. 0 648 173 (filed June 
30, 1993)). 
195 See id. at [2]. 
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between Dublin and Holyhead three or four times a day.  On each visit it is in UK 
territorial waters for about three hours.”196 At issue in Irish Ferries was:  (1) whether the 
accused catamaran was temporarily present in the U.K.; and (2) whether the accused use 
met the requirement of the U.K. temporary-presence statute that it be “of a product or 
process in the body or operation of the” ship, even though “the invention as claimed was 
the whole ship” rather than just a part of it.197 
In the trial court’s opinion, the court first considered whether the accused ship 
was temporarily present in the United Kingdom.198 In interpreting the term 
“temporarily,” the court first looked to the negotiating history of Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention, which formed the basis for the U.K. temporary-presence statute.199 The 
court noted that the Czechoslovakian delegation “wanted to ensure that regular and 
periodical entries into a country were covered by the Convention” and thus changed the 
word “penetrate” to “enter.”200 The court also considered the holding of the German 
 
196 Id. at [13]; see also Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [62] (“Its home 
port is Dublin which means amongst other things that, where possible, it berths there 
overnight.”). 
197 Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [14]-[15].  This requirement of the 
U.K. temporary-presence statute is part of the “exclusively for the needs of the vessel” 
element. 
198 Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [64]-[79]. 
199 Id. at [67]. 
200 Id. at [68]-[69].  But see Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [32]-[34] 
(noting that in the original and official French text of Article 5ter, the word “pénétréront 
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court in Rolltrailer201 that regular and repeated entries into a country could be considered 
to be temporary.202 
The trial court observed that the U.K. statute and Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention “are concerned to ensure that trade and the carriage of persons between 
countries is not hindered by patent rights applying to the means of transport.”203 The 
court noted that “the underlying principle is that the normal operation of the vehicle is to 
be taken out of the scope of patent infringement.”204 Thus, consistent with these policies, 
the court interpreted the term “temporarily” as follows: 
[The U.K. temporary-presence statute] comes into play to 
protect the vehicle in so far as it is engaged in inter-State 
passage.  The word “temporarily” should be construed in 
that context.  Its primary purpose is to distinguish between 
vehicles which are engaged essentially in internal 
operations and those which travel between countries.  For 
that reason, . . . questions of frequency, persistency and 
regularity have little to do with determining whether a 
vessel is temporarily within the territorial waters of the 
 
[sic]” remained unchanged); infra nn.231-233 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Court of Appeal’s reasoning concerning this discrepancy).  A U.S. district court 
apparently considered the same negotiating history of Article 5ter in Cali v. Japan 
Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
201 LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.).  For a discussion of 
Rolltrailer, see supra Part II.C.1. 
202 Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [70]-[72]. 
203 Id. at [73]. 
204 Id. 
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United Kingdom.  Temporarily means “for a limited period 
of time.”205 
The trial court rejected an interpretation of “temporarily” as meaning the opposite 
of “permanently.”206 Instead, the court stated that the statute “must be read to be 
consistent with [its] legislative purpose.”207 Thus, the court reasoned: 
It should be noticed that the legislation is concerned with 
ships and other vehicles which “enter temporarily” the 
territory of the State.  This suggest [sic] that one has to 
have regard to the intention of the operator of the vehicle at 
the time of entry.  If, at that time, it is the intention that the 
vehicle should move in and then move out, the entry would 
be temporary.  Although an exact date of expected 
departure may not be necessary, the operator must intend 
that the vehicle should continue its journey by leaving the 
territory in reasonable time consistent with carrying out its 
role as a means of transport used in international carriage of 
goods and persons.  An expectation that the vehicle may 
well leave the State at some time in the future, and in this 
sense has not entered the territory on a permanent basis, 
should not be enough.208 
The trial court also rejected the patentee’s argument that under a broad 
interpretation of “temporarily,” “the Jonathan Swift would be held to be temporarily in 
 
205 Id. at [75].  The Irish Ferries trial court’s distinction between internal and 
international operations is similar to that of the U.S. district court in Cali. See Cali, 380
F. Supp. at 1126. 
206 Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [76]. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. The trial court did not decide whether an entry would be temporary “if the 
vehicle enters a country’s territory temporarily but, once there, the operator changes his 
mind,” though the court did speculate that such an entry would not be considered 
temporary.  Id. at [77]. 
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both Irish and British waters and permanently in neither.”209 The patentee argued that 
such an interpretation would allow an infringer to escape liability in both countries 
because Ireland also has a temporary-presence provision.210 However, the court 
reasoned: 
It is possible that “enter” should be contrasted with 
“return”.  A vehicle which returns to its operational home 
may not be treated the same way as one which temporarily 
visits foreign lands.  If that is so, the Jonathan Swift would 
not be immune from suit in Dublin, its home port.  Thus, 
[the patentee’s] reductio ad absurdum that the ship could 
not infringe anywhere (other than the place of construction) 
would not be true.211 
Applying its interpretation of “temporarily,” the trial court concluded that the 
accused ship entered the waters of the United Kingdom only temporarily.212 The court 
reasoned: 
Applying the above principles to the Jonathan Swift, it can 
only infringe when it is within our territorial waters.  The 
issue of infringement therefore has to be looked each time 
it is here.  Weather permitting, it does not stay in our waters 
for more than about three hours at a time.  That is the 
intention of the operator . . . . The fact that the same 
journey is repeated over and over again, does not alter the 
fact that each entry into our waters is designed to be short-
lived.  Indeed, the fact that it is repeated so frequently 
emphasises the temporary nature of its entry and the fact 
that it is a means of transport being used in the international 
 
209 Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [65], [77]. 
210 Id. at [65]; see Patents Act, 1992, § 42(d)-(e) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992_1.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2005). 
211 Id. at [77]. 
212 Id. at [78]. 
60 
carriage of goods and people.  Its entry each time is 
temporary.213 
Next, the trial court considered the patentee’s second argument—that the 
temporary-presence defense applied only to patents covering “parts of the ship, not . . . 
the ship as a whole.”214 The language of the statute at issue was:  “exclusively for the 
needs of a relevant ship, of a product or process in the body of such a ship or in its 
machinery, tackle, or other accessories.”215 The patentee argued that because the patent 
claims at issue were directed to “a multihull vessel, it is the Jonathan Swift as a whole 
which is the infringing article[, which therefore] falls outside the scope of the” 
temporary-presence defense.216 
The trial court rejected this argument for four reasons.217 First, the court said that 
there was no “logic . . . in having an exclusion effective against parts but not the whole of 
 
213 Id. The court’s focus on each individual entry of the vessel into the country is 
consistent with the German court’s decision in Rolltrailer. See Rolltrailer Translation, 
supra note 158, at B13 (“As the subject of the patent infringement is only the individual 
roll[] trailer, the only important point is whether the individual roll[] trailer is only 
temporarily in the country.”). 
214 Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [80]-[82]. 
215 Patents Act, 1977, § 60(5)(d) (U.K.) (emphasis added).  This language is 
analogous to the “exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle” language of 
§ 272. 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
216 Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [80]. 
217 Id. at [81]. 
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a vessel.”218 Second, the patentee’s proposed construction of the statute would 
“undermine” its purpose—”to prevent patents interfering with the means used to carry 
international trade.”219 Third, the patentee’s proposed construction was not consistent 
with Article 5ter of the Paris Convention, in that Article 5ter “excludes ‘the use of devices 
forming the subject of the patent in the construction” of the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle.220 
Fourth and finally, although the claims of the patent-in-suit were written to cover the 
vessel as a whole, the invention itself “is much more limited”—”the use of the special 
strengthening design in part of” the ship, “not the totality of the ship.”221 Therefore, for 
 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. (quoting Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78). 
221 Id. at [82].  The court explained: 
If [the patentee] is right, whether or not the exclusion is 
effective would be, in some cases, a matter of chance.  The 
claims here are written in a form which covers the multi-
hull vessel as a whole, but the invention is much more 
limited.  It is not concerned with most of what goes into the 
vessel, such as the design of the propulsion, steering, hull, 
hydrodynamics, the accommodation and so forth.  The 
inventive concept in claim 3 is the employment of the 
lattice work and box structure in the superstructure of the 
ship.  The claims could have been limited to that feature. 
The point can be illustrated by reference to the well known 
patent example of the invention of a new steam whistle.  
Claim 1 of the patent is to the steam whistle.  Claim 10 is to 
a container ship with a steam whistle attached to the funnel.  
It would make little sense if claim 1 was caught by the 
subsection but claim 10 was not.  For this reason, even if 
[the patentee] were otherwise right on this issue, I would 
hold that the question whether an act “consists of the use, 
exclusively for the needs of a relevant ship, of a product or 
process in the body of such a ship” should be answered 
purposively.  In other words, is the invention the whole ship 
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these reasons, the trial court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute applied, 
providing the accused infringer with a defense to infringement.222 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court.223 The Court of 
Appeal agreed with the trial court’s reasoning but also considered additional materials.224 
First, the court considered a case interpreting the word “temporarily” in the context of a 
vehicle regulation as meaning “for a limited time.”225 However, the court rejected this 
definition, reasoning that the court in that case was interpreting the word “temporarily” in 
a far different context—that of “particular road traffic regulations,” rather than 
international commerce as in the temporary-presence statute.226 
Next, the court agreed with the trial court’s definition of “temporarily”: 
The judge was right . . . that the word  “temporarily” should 
be construed as “transient” or “for a limited period of 
time”.  That word cannot have been intended to be 
construed so that vessels which regularly went between this 
country and say New York or Sydney or Rotterdam would 
not come within the exception, but vessels who did that 
 
or is it for a part only?  In this case the invention or 
inventive concept is not the totality of the ship but the use 
of the special strengthening design in part of it. 
Id. 
222 Id. at [83]. 
223 Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 
(Eng.), aff’g Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737. 
224 Id. at [19]. 
225 Id. at [21]-[25] (citing British Road Servs. v. Wurzal [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1508 
(Eng.)). 
226 Id. at [25]. 
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occasionally would do so.  Whether a vessel visits 
temporarily, in the context of [Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention], cannot depend on frequency.227 
The court then found support for this definition in the U.S. Cali case, which the trial court 
had not considered.228 
The court next considered but disagreed with the trial court’s treatment of the 
negotiating history of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention.229 The trial court relied on the 
Czechoslovakian delegation’s urging to change the word “penetrate” to “enter” to ensure 
that Article 5ter would apply to “regular and periodical entries into a country.”230 
However, the court noted that in the original French text, which the trial court had not 
considered, the word “pénétréront [sic; pénétreront]”231 remained unchanged.232 Thus, 
the court stated that “it is not possible to come to any conclusion as to the effect of [the 
Czechoslovakian delegation’s] intervention nor what was the attitude of the Sous-
Commission.”233 However, the word “pénétreront” can mean “will enter” in addition to 
 
227 Id. at [26]. 
228 Id. at [26]-[31]. 
229 Id. at [32]-[34]. 
230 Id. at [32]-[33]. 
231 The word “pénétreront” means “will enter” or “will penetrate” in French.  See 
GRAND DICTIONNAIRE: FRANÇAIS-ANGLAIS–ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS 655 (1993) [hereinafter 
GRAND DICTIONNAIRE] (defining “pénétrer” as, inter alia, “to enter” or “to penetrate”). 
232 Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [34]. 
233 Id. 
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“will penetrate.”234 Hence, the lack of change in this wording does not indicate that the 
committee rejected the Czechoslovakian delegation’s proposal.  Thus, the negotiating 
history of Article 5ter may indicate that the committee intended to include regular and 
periodic entries within the scope of Article 5ter.235 
The court next considered the trial court’s reliance on the Rolltrailer decision.236 
The court observed that the German law applied in Rolltrailer had not been amended to 
comply with Article 5ter, so reliance on that case “must be treated with caution.”237 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the Rolltrailer decision 
supported its definition of “temporarily.”238 
Additionally, the court looked at a “Guide to the application of the Paris 
Convention as revised in 1967 by Professor G. H. C. Bodenhausen who was the Director 
of the body now known as WIPO,”239 which the trial court also had not considered.  
According to this Guide, under Article 5ter: “Temporary entry includes periodical 
 
234 See GRAND DICTIONNAIRE, supra note 231, at 655. 
235 See LADAS, supra note 6, at 248 (“‘Temporairement,’ it was admitted at the 
Conference of The Hague, on the suggestion of the Czechoslovakian delegation, 
comprises also the periodical entries of vessels into the territorial waters of another 
country.”). 
236 Id. at [35]. 
237 Id. 
238 See id. 
239 Id. at [36]. 
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entries.”240 Thus, this source provided further support for the court’s holding that the 
accused catamaran was present in U.K. waters only temporarily. 
Finally, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the accused 
use met the requirement of the U.K. temporary-presence statute that it be “of a product or 
process in the body or operation of the” ship, even though “the invention as claimed was 
the whole ship” rather than just a part of it241 for the same reasons the trial court gave.242 
The court stated:  “The invention is that set out in the claim . . . . However the product of 
the invention is the features of the claim which are properly referred to as ‘in the body’ of 
the ship.”243 Therefore, the Court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s holding that the 
U.K. temporary-presence defense provided the accused infringer with a complete defense 
to patent infringement.244 
III. NATIONAL STEEL CAR, LTD. V. CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY 
In 2004, the Federal Circuit interpreted § 272 for the first time in National Steel 
Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway.245 The patent in National Steel Car covered a 
 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at [14]-[15]. 
242 Id. at [37]. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at [38]. 
245 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004).  Although the interpretation of § 272 was a case of first impression for the 
Federal Circuit, it was not the first time a court of appeals considered the statute.  The 
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type of rail car known as “a depressed center-beam flat car” or a “drop-deck” center-
beam car.246 Railroads use center-beam cars to haul lumber.247 “The car described in the 
‘575 patent is a ‘depressed,’ or ‘drop-deck,’ car because the portion of the floor between 
the [wheels] is lowered relative to the height of the floor over the [wheels].”248 The 
 
Second Circuit necessarily addressed the statute in Cali v. Japan Airlines Co., 535 F.2d 
1240 (2d Cir. 1975), although the Second Circuit did not issue a written opinion. 
246 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1322 (citing Depressed Center Beam Flat Car, U.S. Patent 
No. 4,951,575 (filed June 9, 1989)). 
247 Id. The Federal Circuit described the center-beam rail car as follows: 
The car described in the ‘575 patent is a “center-beam” car 
because the primary structure of the car is a truss-like beam 
element that runs the length of the center of the car between 
the wheel assemblies . . . . Center-beam cars are an industry 
standard for hauling lumber, which is piled onto a floor that 
extends laterally to each side of the car from the bottom of 
the center beam and then secured to the center beam. 
Id. 
248 Id. The court described two advantages of the drop-deck center-beam “over 
the non-drop-deck version”: 
First, it can carry a volumetrically larger load. Given the 
relatively low density of wood, ordinary center-beam cars 
reach volume capacity before they reach weight capacity, 
leaving each car inefficiently under-loaded in terms of 
weight. Second, the dropping of the deck lowers the car’s 
center of the gravity, permitting safer loading, transit, and 
unloading because a higher center of gravity renders the car 
more vulnerable to tipping. 
Id. 
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accused infringer, a Canadian railroad company,249 entered into a contract to purchase a 
fleet of drop-deck center-beam cars.250 The accused infringer intended to use the cars 
ninety percent of the time to haul lumber from Canada to the United States, and ten 
percent of the time to haul lumber within Canada only.251 The court described the use of 
the cars as follows: 
 
249 The accused infringer was Canadian Pacific Railway (“CPR”), which “is a 
Canadian railroad company that owns rail lines in Canada and in the United States and 
operates trains on these lines.”  Id. at 1323 (footnote omitted). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. At the time the patentee filed suit, and during the pendency of the suit, the 
accused cars had not yet entered the United States from Canada, where they were 
manufactured.  See id. Thus, interestingly, there could be no actual infringement because 
the cars had never been in the United States yet.  See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (“[I]t is not an infringement to make or use a patented 
product outside of the United States.”); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 
(1856) (noting that the patent laws “do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the 
limits of the United States”).  Thus, it may seem at first glance that subject matter 
jurisdiction was lacking, given that the Federal Circuit has held that the patent laws 
“cannot be interpreted to cover acts other than an actual making, using or selling of the 
patented invention.”  Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir. 
1990).  However, subject matter jurisdiction did exist in National Steel Car. According 
to the Federal Circuit in Lang, “[i]f the controversy requirement is met by a sufficient 
allegation of immediacy and reality, we see no reason why a patentee should be unable to 
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Because there is no market need for American lumber to be 
shipped into Canada, [the accused infringer’s] center-beam 
flat cars return to Canada empty 99.2 percent of the time.  
Measured either on the basis of days or track mileage 
traveled, a center-beam flat car is in the United States 
approximately 56 to 57 percent of the time.252 
The patentee253 filed a patent infringement suit and moved for a preliminary 
injunction.254 The district court granted the motion and issued a preliminary injunction 
against the accused infringer.255 “The district court held that neither of the two defenses 
 
seek a declaration of infringement against a future infringer when a future infringer is 
able to maintain a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement under the same 
circumstances.”  Id. at 764.  National Steel Car was such a suit for declaratory judgment.  
See 1st Am. Compl. at 3, 4, Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F. 
Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (No. CIV.A. 02-6877).  Therefore, subject matter 
jurisdiction did exist. 
252 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1323-24. 
253 The patentee was National Steel Car, Ltd. (“NSC”), which is “a manufacturer 
of railway cars.”  Id. at 1322. 
254 Id. at 1324.  The patentee also sued The Greenbrier Companies, Inc., the 
manufacturer of the accused rail cars, in a separate action in the District of Delaware.  See 
Complaint, Nat’l Steel Car v. Greenbrier Cos., No. 02-1427-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 22, 
2002). 
255 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1324.   
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raised by [the accused infringer] had substantial merit.”256 However, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision.257 
Because of the contrast between the district court’s interpretation of the language 
of § 272 and that of the Federal Circuit, it is interesting to first consider the district 
court’s opinion in detail.  Therefore, Part III.A first discusses the district court’s opinion 
in National Steel Car. Next, Part III.B examines the Federal Circuit’s opinion and 
concludes that the Federal Circuit correctly interpreted § 272. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT NARROWLY INTERPRETS SECTION 272 
In concluding that the accused infringer’s temporary-presence defense lacked 
substantial merit, the district court interpreted the language of § 272 narrowly.  At issue 
before the district court were almost all the elements of § 272:  (1) whether the accused 
cars were vehicles of another country; (2) whether the accused cars would be temporarily 
present in the United States; (3) whether the patented invention was used exclusively for 
 
256 Id. To succeed in its preliminary-injunction motion, the patentee had to, inter 
alia, “demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.”  Id. at 1324-25.  
However, no preliminary injunction could issue if the accused infringer “raise[d] a 
substantial question concerning either infringement or validity, i.e., assert[ed] an 
infringement or invalidity defense that the patentee [could not] prove lack[ed] substantial 
merit.”  Id. at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In addition to its temporary-presence defense under § 272, the accused infringer 
asserted an invalidity defense.  Id. at 1324.  Moreover, the accused infringer also asserted 
a defense of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct.  NSC I, 254 F. Supp. at 572-73. 
257 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1340. 
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the needs of the vehicle; and (4) whether the accused cars were sold in the United 
States.258 
1. Whether the Accused Cars Were Vehicles of Another Country 
After discussing the history of § 272259 and examining cases interpreting § 272,260 
the district court first considered whether the accused cars were vehicles of another 
country.261 With no analysis or explanation, the district court stated:  “The accused rail 
car, itself, is not a vehicle.  It is part of a vehicle—a train.  A train satisfies the vehicle 
requirement of Section 272.   The question is whether the train carrying the accused rail 
cars is a vehicle of another country.”262 The court then went on to hold that the U.S. 
trains that would be carrying the accused cars were not vehicles of another country.263 
The court reasoned that these trains were not foreign vehicles because the railroad 
intended to routinely transfer the accused cars from trains pulled by Canadian 
locomotives to trains pulled by U.S. locomotives upon reaching particular destinations in 
 
258 NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 555-57. 
259 See id. at 555.  As part of this discussion the court examined Brown v. 
Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).  For a discussion of Brown, see supra Part I.B. 
260 NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 555-56.  The court discussed Cali v. Japan Airlines, 
Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975), and 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993).  For discussions of these 
cases, see supra Parts II.A and II.B, respectively. 
261 NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
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the United States.264 The court distinguished Brown,265 Cali,266 and Hughes267 because 
unlike the situation in National Steel Car, the patented inventions at issue in those cases 
“remained a part of a vehicle that was under the flag of the other country when the 
vehicle and the invention were in the United States.”268 Thus, the court concluded that 
the relevant vehicle, the train, would not be a vehicle of another country.269 
264 Id. The court observed: 
 The accused rail cars will be brought into the 
United States on a train powered by a CPR locomotive, and 
for as long as CPR’s rail lines continue in the United States, 
the cars will remain part of a train powered by a CPR 
locomotive.  During this period, the accused rail cars are 
part of a vehicle of another country. 
 After the CPR rail lines end in the United States, the 
cars will be switched to trains powered by locomotives 
owned and operated by United States companies.  The cars 
will then continue to travel to various destinations in the 
United States.  The cars will not return to trains powered by 
CPR locomotives until the cars return to places in the 
United States served by CPR.  During the time the accused 
rail cars are part of trains powered by locomotives owned 
and operated by United States companies, the accused rail 
cars are not used in a vehicle of another country. 
Id. 
265 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856). 
266 Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535
F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975). 
267 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993). 
268 NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
269 Id.. 
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2. Whether the Accused Cars Would Be Temporarily Present in the 
United States 
The district court next concluded that the accused rail cars would not be 
temporarily present in the United States for two reasons.270 First, the court reasoned that 
the cars would not be temporarily present because “[a]n accused rail car [would] spend 
the majority of its time delivering lumber to United States destinations.”271 The court 
observed that:  “This is not the same as the airplanes in Cali that returned home after 
flying into the country, the ship in Brown which returned home after sailing to Boston, or 
the spacecraft in Hughes which went to outer space after being in the United States for 
the spacecraft’s takeoff.”272 Second, the court held that the cars would not be temporarily 
present because the accused infringer would “derive significant benefits from using 
[them] in the United States by transporting its lumber on the . . . cars to various 
destinations throughout the United States.”273 The court again distinguished Brown, Cali,
and Hughes: “The presence in the United States of the patented invention in Brown, 
Cali, and Hughes was temporary because the only real benefits of using the accused 
product for the defendants in those cases came when the product was used outside of the 
United States.”274 Thus, the court concluded that the cars would not be temporarily 
present in the United States.275 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
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3. Whether the Patented Invention Was Used Exclusively for the Needs of 
the Vehicle 
The district court next concluded that the patented invention was not used 
exclusively for the needs of the vehicle.276 The court contrasted the situation in National 
Steel Car with that in Brown, Cali, and Hughes, observing that in those cases, “the 
accused product was being used in a part of the vehicle that was essential to making the 
vehicle work.”277 According to the court, in National Steel Car “the trains can work 
without the accused rail car.  The accused rail car does not help propel the trains, help in 
positioning the trains, or help in any other way to make the trains work.”278 Thus, the 
court held that the patented invention was not used exclusively for the needs of the 
vehicle.279 
4. Whether the Accused Cars Were Sold or Offered for Sale  in the 
United States 
Finally, the district court considered whether the accused rail cars were sold in the 
United States.280 This portion of the district court’s opinion is redacted.281 However, the 
Federal Circuit described the district court’s conclusions as follows: 
 
276 Id. at 557.  Recall that the court considered the relevant vehicle to be a train 
carrying the accused rail cars, not one of the cars itself.  Id. at 556. 
277 Id. at 557. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 See id. 
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[T]he district court held that the use of the [patented] 
invention in the [accused rail car] did not qualify as a 
noninfringing use under section 272 because the language 
of section 272 requires that the invention not be “offered 
for sale or sold in . . . the United States.”  The district court 
found that [the car’s manufacturer] had “offered the 
accused rail car for sale to at least three different companies 
in the United States,” and that “[the accused infringer], 
itself, may sell the accused rail cars to leasing companies in 
the United States.”282 
Therefore, the district court concluded: 
 Because at least three of the required elements—
being part of a vehicle of another country, temporary 
presence in the United States, and use exclusively for the 
train’s needs—are not present and because it appears that 
the accused rail cars will be sold in the United States, [the 
accused infringer’s] defense based on Section 272 lacks 
substantial merit.283 
282 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (omission in original), rev’g 254 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
283 NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 557.  The court also considered the accused 
infringer’s invalidity defense for anticipation and obviousness and held that these 
defenses lacked substantial merit.  Id. at 557-72.  Additionally, the court held that the 
accused infringer’s defense of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct also lacked 
substantial merit.  Id. at 572-73.  Moreover, the court held that the patentee would suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 573-75.  Finally, the 
court considered the other two preliminary-injunction factors—balance of hardships and 
public interest—and concluded that these factors favored the granting of the injunction.  
Id. at 575-77.  Thus, the court granted the patentee’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 
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The accused infringer appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.284 
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVERSES THE DISTRICT COURT AND 
CORRECTLY INTERPRETS SECTION 272 
The Federal Circuit in National Steel Car reversed the district court’s order 
granting the patentee’s preliminary-injunction motion.285 The Federal Circuit held “that 
 
284 See NSC II, 357 F.3d 1319.  After the district court’s decision but before the 
Federal Circuit’s decision, an Oregon congressman introduced a bill that would amend 
§ 272 to explicitly include rail cars within its coverage.  See H.R. 1946, 108th Cong. 
(2003); Bill Exempts Rail Cars from Patent Infringement, 66 BNA’S PAT., TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT J. 50, 50 (2003).  The bill was sponsored by Rep. Greg Walden (R-Or.) 
and cosponsored by Reps. Earl Blumenauer (D-Or.) and Norman Dicks (D-Wash.).  Id. 
The bill reads:  “Section 272 of title 35, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following:  ‘This section shall apply to any vehicle that is a railroad car entering 
and leaving the United States on a recurring basis’.”  H.R. 1946, 108th Cong. (2003).  
According to a published report, “[t]he bill seems to have been prompted by” the district 
court’s decision in National Steel Car. Bill Exempts Rail Cars from Patent Infringement,
supra, at 50.  The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee.  Id.  Since then, Congress 
has taken no further action.  See Bill Summary and Status, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR01946:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Aug. 8, 2005).  
Indeed, such an amendment is no longer necessary in light of the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in National Steel Car reversing the district court’s decision and holding that the 
scope of § 272 does include a rail car entering and leaving the United States on a 
recurring basis. 
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the district court abused its discretion in holding that [the accused infringer’s] section 272 
defense lacked substantial merit.”286 
The Federal Circuit correctly interpreted each of the elements of § 272.  Unlike 
the district court, the Federal Circuit broadly interpreted the language of § 272.287 Also 
unlike the district court’s interpretation, the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of 
§ 272 is consistent with applicable statutes, precedent, and international obligations, as 
well as with the policies underlying the temporary-presence defense.  Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit’s broad interpretation of § 272 bolsters the value of the temporary-presence 
defense in today’s global economy.288 
The interpretation of § 272 was an issue of first impression for the Federal Circuit 
in National Steel Car.289 The court first set the stage for interpreting § 272 by addressing 
the statute’s legislative history.290 Next, the court discussed the Supreme Court’s holding 
 
285 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1340. 
286 Id. at 1334.  Additionally, the Federal Circuit held “that the district court erred 
in its conclusion that [the patentee] demonstrated that [the accused infringer’s] 
obviousness defense lacked substantial merit.”  Id. at 1335. 
287 See id. at 1325-34. 
288 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the 
temporary-presence defense in today’s global economy). 
289 Id. at 1326. 
290 Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 272, see supra Part I.D. 
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in Brown.291 After that, the court quoted Article 5ter of the Paris Convention,292 and then 
briefly summarized Cali and Hughes Aircraft.293 Finally, the court analyzed the accused 
infringer’s defense under § 272.294 The court addressed in series each of the four 
elements of § 272 at issue:  (1) whether the accused rail cars were vehicles of another 
country;295 (2) whether the accused cars would be only temporarily present in the United 
States;296 (3) whether the patented invention was used exclusively for the needs of the 
vehicle;297 and (4) whether the accused cars were sold or offered for sale in the United 
States.298 
291 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1326-27 (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
183 (1856)).  For a discussion of Brown, see supra Part I.B. 
292 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1327 (citing Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78).  For 
a discussion of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention, see supra Part I.C. 
293 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1327-28 (citing Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 
1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993)).  For a discussion of Cali and Hughes Aircraft, see 
supra Parts II.A and II.B, respectively. 
294 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328-34.  The court reviewed the district court’s statutory 
interpretation of § 272 “without deference.”  Id. at 1325. 
295 Id. at 1328-29. 
296 Id. at 1329-32. 
297 Id. at 1332-33. 
298 Id. at 1333-34. 
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1. Whether the Accused Cars Were Vehicles of Another Country 
The Federal Circuit first addressed the district court’s determination that the 
accused infringer would not use the patented invention in vehicles of another country.299 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reasoning that the focus should be 
on the train rather than the individual accused cars: 
 Although we recognize that in some instances there 
may be ambiguity between containers that are merely the 
cargo of a vessel or vehicle, and vessels or vehicles that are 
themselves aggregated and transported in a collective 
fashion for greater efficiency, we discern no such 
ambiguity here: Congress has defined “vehicle” with 
sufficient breadth to include an individual rail car.300 
The Federal Circuit looked to the statutory definition of “vehicle” in the Dictionary 
Act,301 concluding that “[t]his definition controls our interpretation of ‘vehicle’ in section 
 
299 Id. at 1328-29 (“[A]ccording to the district court, the train, not the rail car, is 
the relevant vehicle to examine under section 272, and the nationality of the locomotive 
determines the nationality of the train.”). 
300 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328. 
301 1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).  A district court recently applied the Dictionary Act in 
determining whether an aircraft was a vehicle under the USA Patriot Act of 2001 in a 
case involving the so-called “shoe bomber,” Richard C. Reid.  United States v. Reid, 206 
F. Supp. 2d 132, 138-39 (D. Mass. 2002) (granting motion to dismiss one count against 
the defendant because an aircraft is not a vehicle under the USA Patriot Act of 2001); see 
Kevin Cullen, More Suspects Are Charged in July 21 London Conspiracy, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2005, at A7 (describing Richard Reid as “the ‘shoe bomber’ who was 
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272.”302 The Dictionary Act broadly defines “vehicle” as follows:  “The word ‘vehicle’ 
includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of 
 
convicted . . . of trying to down a Paris-to-Miami flight with explosives hidden in his 
sneakers in December 2001”).  The court described the Dictionary Act: 
The Dictionary Act of the United States Code, 1 U.S.C. § 1 
et seq., provides general definitions for a handful of words 
appearing within the code, along with general rules of 
construction, that apply to the entire code in the absence of 
a more specific indication within the statute being 
analyzed.  Although the Dictionary Act defines but a few 
words appearing in the code, the word “vehicle” is one of 
them. 
Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (citation omitted).  The court in Reid further observed that 
“the Dictionary Act is not an obscure, forgotten portion of the United States Code, but 
instead remains vital to the process of interpreting the rest of the code.”  Id. at 139.  
Interestingly, some commentators have argued that the Dictionary Act is unconstitutional 
for violating separation-of-powers concerns.  Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of 
Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 348 & n.78 (2004). 
302 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 4; Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 138; 
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1, 54 (West 1954)); see 
also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 232 n.46 (1993) (applying the 
Dictionary Act definitions of “vessel” and “vehicle” in determining whether § 272 
applied to spacecraft).  The Federal Circuit in National Steel Car noted that the 
Commentary of P.J. Federico, one of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952 in which 
§ 272 was first enacted, explicitly stated “that the definition of vehicle provided in 1 
U.S.C. § 4 would apply to section 272.”  NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328. 
80 
being used, as a means of transportation on land.”303 The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
“[t]his definition . . . leads us to define a rail car individually—not only the train as a 
whole—as a vehicle within the meaning of section 272.”304 Therefore, the court 
“conclude[d] that [an accused rail car] may be a foreign vehicle and therefore” may be 
covered by § 272.305 
303 1 U.S.C. § 4.  Further emphasizing the breadth of the definition of “vehicle,” 
this statute is entitled “‘Vehicle’ as including all means of land transportation.”  Id. 
304 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328.  To determine whether a rail car falls within the 
Dictionary Act definition of vehicle, the court determined that “[t]he ordinary meaning of 
‘carriage’ . . . is defined to encompass ‘means of conveyance,’ ‘a wheeled vehicle for 
people,’ or ‘a wheeled support carrying a burden,’ such as ‘a gun carriage.’”  Id. (citing 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343 (1993)). 
305 Id. at 1328-29.  Moreover, the court concluded that the accused rail cars were 
“vehicles of Canada [and that Canada] afford[s] similar privileges to United States 
vehicles as required by the reciprocity provision in section 272.”  Id. at 1328 n.10.  The 
current Canadian temporary-presence statute provides: 
 No patent shall extend to prevent the use of any 
invention in any ship, vessel, aircraft or land vehicle of any 
country entering Canada temporarily or accidentally, if the 
invention is employed exclusively for the needs of the ship, 
vessel, aircraft or land vehicle, and not so used for the 
manufacture of any goods to be sold within or exported 
from Canada. 
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 23 (Can.).  Although the Canadian and U.S. statutes are, for 
the most part, very similar, the scope of the Canadian statute is broader in that it does not 
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The Federal Circuit’s reasoning is sound.  The Dictionary Act, which the district 
court ignored, mandates that a rail car be considered a “vehicle” under § 272.306 Indeed, 
where Congress supplies an “explicit definition” of a statutory term, courts must follow 
that definition.307 
Moreover, even in the absence of such an explicit definition, a rail car falls under 
the ordinary meaning of the word “vehicle.”308 When § 272 was enacted in 1952,309 the 
relevant dictionary definition of “vehicle” was:  “Any kind of a carriage moving on land, 
either on wheels or runners, comprehending coaches, chariots, buggies, wagons, carts of 
every kind, sleighs, sleds, and the like; a conveyance.”310 Thus, because a rail car is “a 
 
require reciprocity, whereas the U.S. statute does.  Compare id., with 35 U.S.C. § 272 
(2000). 
306 See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328. 
307 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000); accord AK Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 226 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that courts may not 
“substitute their own definition for that of Congress”). 
308 Where “terms used in a statute are undefined, [a court must] give them their 
ordinary meaning.”  Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995). 
309 “[T]he most relevant time for determining a statutory term’s meaning” is when 
the statute “became law.”  MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 
(1994). 
310 WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE: UNABRIDGED 1903 (1951).  To determine the ordinary meaning of a 
statutory term, “it is appropriate [for a court] to consult dictionaries.”  Huffman v. Office 
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carriage moving on land … on wheels,” a rail car is a “vehicle” under the ordinary 
meaning of the word at the time of the enactment of § 272. 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit was correct in rejecting the district court’s 
implicit view that something must provide its own propulsive power to be a “vehicle.”311 
Indeed, there is ample legal authority that a “vehicle” need not be capable of self-
propulsion.  For example, under U.S. statutory and case law, a non-self-propelled 
 
of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see The B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. 
Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Courts may take judicial 
notice of … dictionaries.”). 
Additionally, there are even broader dictionary definitions that include aircraft 
and watercraft as vehicles.  See United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (“An example is found in the seventh edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
(1999), which defines vehicle as ‘any conveyance used in transporting passengers or 
merchandise by land, water, or air.’); cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 
(1931) (“No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word [vehicle] to signify a 
conveyance working on land, water or air, and sometimes legislation extends the use in 
that direction . . . .”). 
311 See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 
556 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“The accused rail car, itself, is not a vehicle.   It is part of a 
vehicle—a train.”), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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spacecraft is considered a vehicle under § 272.312 Additionally, many federal regulations 
treat non-self-propelled rail cars as vehicles.313 Furthermore, non-self-propelled truck 
trailers are considered to be vehicles under federal regulations, state vehicle codes, and 
case law.314 
312 49 U.S.C. § 2457(k) (2000); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 
197, 239-40 (1993) (holding that a non-self-propelled spacecraft attached to a rocket is a 
vehicle for the purposes of § 272 under 49 U.S.C. § 2457(k)). 
313 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 201.1(t) (“Rail car means a non-self-propelled vehicle 
designed for and used on railroad tracks.” (emphasis added)); 26 C.F.R. § 1.190-2(2) 
(referring to “a vehicle, such as a bus, a railroad car . . .” (emphasis added)); 49 C.F.R. § 
661.3 (“Rolling stock means transit vehicles such as buses, vans, cars, railcars . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  But cf. Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] 
EWCA (Civ) 66, [21]-[25] (Eng.) (concluding that the definition of “temporarily” from 
case law concerning vehicle regulations was not applicable to a temporary-presence-
defense provision because of differing policy considerations). 
314 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 571.3 (“Trailer means a motor vehicle with or without 
motive power, designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by another 
motor vehicle.”); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 102 (defining a “trailer” as “[a] vehicle designed to 
be towed by a motor vehicle”); United States v. A Single Story Double Wide Trailer, 727 
F. Supp. 149, 152 n.3 (D. Del. 1989) (holding that a trailer is a vehicle under Delaware 
law). 
84 
Finally, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “vehicle” is consistent with that of 
the Rolltrailer315 court in Germany, which lends support to the conclusion that the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation was correct.316 In Rolltrailer, the court held that non-self-
propelled roll trailers were vehicles, stating that “it is not crucial how the vehicle moves 
and whether it has its own driving force.”317 The court further held that the Finnish roll 
trailers remained vehicles of another country even though they were deposited on and 
transported by German ships.318 Therefore, based on the reasoning of the German court 
in Rolltrailer, a rail car is a vehicle, and it remains a vehicle of another country even if is 
switched from a Canadian locomotive to a U.S. locomotive.  Therefore, for these reasons, 
 
315 LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.), translated in 
Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158.  For a discussion of the Rolltrailer case, see 
supra Part II.C.1. 
316 Cf. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (looking to U.K. case law to determine whether a provision of U.S. patent law 
conformed to an international agreement); Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd., [2003] 
EWCA (Civ) 66, [67] (Eng.) (Munby, J.) (“I am glad to think that on a point arising in 
this area of the law, relating to international commerce, whether by sea or in the air, and 
founded moreover on an international Convention, the courts of this country should feel 
able to come to precisely the same essential conclusion as courts in Germany and the 
United States.”). 
317 Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B9. 
318 Id. at B9-B10. 
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the Federal Circuit was correct in its broad interpretation of “vehicle” as including a rail 
car. 
2. Whether the Accused Cars Would Be Temporarily Present in the 
United States 
The Federal Circuit next interpreted the phrase “entering the United States 
temporarily” of § 272.319 The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that 
whether a vehicle enters “temporarily” hinges on “either the duration of the vehicle’s stay 
in the United States, in relation to the duration of its stay elsewhere, or the benefit of 
which the patent owner is deprived by virtue of the exception to patent rights created by 
section 272.”320 Instead, the court “define[d] a vehicle entering the United States 
‘temporarily’ as a vehicle entering the United States for a limited period of time for the 
sole purpose of engaging in international commerce.”321 
The court began its analysis by observing that the term “temporarily” in § 272 is 
ambiguous.322 The court observed that the plain meaning of “temporarily” is either “for a 
brief period” or “during a limited time.”323 However, the court noted that neither of these 
definitions was satisfactory.324 With respect to “for a brief period,” the court stated that 
 
319 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1329-32 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
320 Id. at 1329. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 2353 (1993)). 
324 Id. 
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the term “‘brief’ is itself indeterminate.”325 The court reasoned that “[b]rief is only a 
relative concept and must be measured in relation to something, but the plain statutory 
language, considered in isolation, does not provide sufficient context to determine the 
appropriate meaning of brief.”326 The court also rejected “during a limited time” as 
unsatisfactory.327 The court explained: 
[T]he idea of an entering for a “limited time” provides a 
rule that is determinable, but that seems to lead to absurdly 
broad results if applied literally without any further 
qualifications.  Limited means nothing more than 
“restricted in . . . duration.”  Entry is literally limited 
provided only that it is not permanent.  An interpretation of 
section 272 that only required a limited entry in this literal 
sense—that only required a vehicle to exit the United States 
at some point before the end of its useful life—and nothing 
more would create a loophole in a patentee’s rights too 
large to be a rational interpretation of Congress’ intent.328 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. (omission in original; citation omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 1312 (1993)).  The U.K. trial court in Irish Ferries I similarly 
rejected an interpretation of “temporarily” as meaning merely “the opposite of 
permanently.”  See Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002] 
EWHC (Pat) 737, [76] (Eng.), aff’d, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.).  According to the 
Irish Ferries court, “[a]n expectation that the vehicle may well leave the State at some 
time in the future, and in this sense has not entered the territory on a permanent basis, 
should not be enough.”  Id. For a discussion of Irish Ferries, see supra Part II.C.2. 
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Thus, because the use of the term “temporarily” in § 272 is ambiguous, the court 
turned to the legislative history of § 272 to determine Congress’ intent with respect to the 
meaning of “temporarily.”329 According to the legislative history, Congress enacted 
§ 272 to codify the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Duchesne330 and meet the 
requirements of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention331 to which the United States is a 
party.332 The court noted that both Brown and Article 5ter “suggest that ‘temporarily’ 
should be interpreted in light of a vehicle’s purpose to participate in international 
commerce at the time of entry—namely, a purpose to enter the United States, engage in 
international commerce, and then depart.”333 The court explained: 
 Both Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention demonstrate a concern to leave the channels of 
international commerce, or more accurately the vessels and 
vehicles that pass through these channels, free from the 
excessive burdens that would result if such vessels or 
vehicles had to conform to the patent laws of all nations 
that the vessel or vehicle visited during its lifetime.  
 
329 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1329. 
330 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856). 
331 Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78.  For a discussion of Article 5ter of the 
Paris Convention, see supra Part I.C. 
332 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1329; see S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 28 (1952) (“This section 
follows the requirement of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, to which the United States is a party, and also codifies the holding of the 
Supreme Court that use of a patented invention on board a foreign ship does not infringe 
a patent.”), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2422. 
333 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1329-30. 
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Different inventions are likely to be patented in different 
countries, and the same invention may be owned by 
different parties in different countries.  In section 272, 
Congress intended to join an international movement to 
place foreign-owned means of international transport 
beyond the reach of domestic patentees’ exclusive rights 
because the cost of complying with multiple, inconsistent 
rights of exclusion provided by the patent regimes of a 
large number of countries would likely place an excessive 
drag on international commerce.334 
The court also considered as persuasive authority the definition of “temporarily” that the 
court in Cali adopted.335 The Federal Circuit noted that like the way it defined the term, 
the Cali court defined “temporarily” “in relation to the ‘international trade’ that section 
272 was intended to protect, not in relation to the duration of the entry.”336 
334 Id. The court also reasoned that the reciprocity requirement in “both Article 
5ter of the Paris Convention and section 272 demonstrate the centrality of international 
commerce in the statutory scheme.”  Id. 
335 Id. at 1330-31 (citing Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1122, 
1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
336 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330-31 (citing Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126).  Moreover, 
the Federal Circuit’s consideration of the accused infringer’s purpose for being in the 
country in its interpretation of “temporarily” is similar to that of the English trial court in 
Irish Ferries. See Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002] 
EWHC (Pat) 737, [76] (Eng.) (“Although an exact date of expected departure may not be 
necessary, the operator must intend that the vehicle should continue its journey by 
leaving the territory in reasonable time consistent with carrying out its role as a means of 
transport used in international carriage of goods and persons.”), aff’d, [2003] EWCA 
(Civ) 66 (Eng.). 
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Next, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s two reasons for its 
conclusion that the accused rail cars would not be “temporarily” present in the Untied 
States.337 The Federal Circuit stated that the fact that the accused rail cars would be 
present in the United States a majority of time was “not relevant to the section 272 
analysis.”338 Based on its definition of “temporarily,” the court reasoned: 
If the cars are entering the United States for a limited 
time—that is, they are not entering permanently—and are 
entering only for the purpose of engaging in international 
commerce—that is, they are entering to unload foreign 
goods and/or to load domestic goods destined for foreign 
markets—they are entering “temporarily” for the purposes 
of section 272 regardless of the length of their stay within 
the jurisdiction of the United States.339 
Finally, the Federal Circuit observed that “neither the magnitude of the benefit derived by 
[the accused infringer] from use of the cars nor the burden imposed on [the patentee] 
from the carve-out of [the accused infringer’s] use from the scope of its right to exclude 
 
337 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331.  The district court’s two reasons that the cars would 
not be temporarily present in the United States were:  (1) “[a]n accused rail car [would] 
spend the majority of its time delivering lumber to United States destinations”; and (2) 
the accused infringer would “derive significant benefits from using [the cars] in the 
United States by transporting its lumber on the . . . cars to various destinations throughout 
the United States.”  Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 
527, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2003), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
338 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331. 
339 Id. 
90 
. . . is relevant to the section 272 analysis.”340 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the 
patentee failed to demonstrate that the accused infringer’s defense under § 272 “lack[ed] 
‘substantial merit’ because the entering ‘temporarily’ condition [was] not satisfied.”341 
340 Id. The Federal Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Cali court that although 
the subtraction from the patentee’s right to exclude may be large as a result of § 272, 
Article 5ter of the Paris Convention, and Article 27 of the Chicago Convention, “[t]hat 
subtraction, although large, appears nevertheless plainly to be what the statutory and 
treaty immunities intend.”  Id. (quoting Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1127). 
341 Id. In addition, the patentee asserted an argument that “raise[d] a question 
regarding whether [the accused infringer would] succeed on the merits of the section 272 
noninfringement defense.”  Id. at 1331-32.  The patentee noted the testimony of a witness 
employed by the accused infringer that “sometimes . . . the U.S. [r]ailway will grab one 
of our [center-beam flat] cars with[out] our permission . . . [a]nd . . . they will move it, 
you know load it to another point [in the United States].”  Id. at 1332 (omissions and all 
but the final alteration in original; footnote omitted).  The patentee argued that this 
testimony showed that the accused infringer’s cars would enter the United States “in part 
with a purpose to engage in domestic, rather than international, commerce.”  Id. In 
response, the court commented: 
Certainly, the unforeseen “grabbing” of one of [the accused 
infringer’s] large fleet of cars without [its] permission 
cannot lead to a reasonable inference that [the accused 
infringer] had a purpose to engage in commerce other than 
international commerce.  However, if [the accused 
infringer] regularly condones such repeated “grabbing” of 
its cars for domestic commerce and [the accused infringer] 
receives remuneration for the “grabbing” that is substantial 
in relation to the income that the cars produce through their 
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The Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of the term “temporarily” is correct.  
The Federal Circuit’s definition is workable, and it properly takes into account the policy 
underlying § 272 based on the statute’s origins in Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention.  The court was correct in holding that § 272 includes vehicles that regularly 
or periodically enter the United States to engage in international trade, as opposed to only 
vehicles that enter the United States infrequently.  Such an interpretation is consistent 
with the conclusions of the courts in Cali in the United States,342 Rolltrailer in 
Germany,343 and Irish Ferries in England.344 Furthermore, such an interpretation is 
 
use in international commerce, a factfinder could infer that 
[the accused infringer’s] intent is not to engage in 
essentially international commerce.  Based on the current 
record, however, we hold that [the patentee’s] allegations 
do not deprive [the accused infringer’s] section 272 defense 
of substantial merit. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
342 See Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126 (“[The] language [of § 272] was chosen to deal 
with an internationally significant matter arising in a world in which scheduled freight 
and passenger services by established international carriers by air and sea were likely to 
require such an immunity to cover countless articles . . . that could turn out to be covered 
by patents in the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
343 See Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B12 (“The fact that the 
defendant’s roll[] trailers enter Germany regularly and repeatedly does not alter the fact 
that the roll[] trailers enter the country only temporarily.” (citations omitted)). 
344 See Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA 
(Civ) 66, [26] (Eng.) (“Whether a vessel visits temporarily . . . cannot depend on 
frequency.”). 
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consistent with the negotiating history of Article 5ter, in which a committee considering 
the adoption of Article 5ter at the Hague Conference “indicated that the words 
‘temporarily’ and ‘accidentally’ were chosen to cover entries into port for more or less 
brief periods whether periodically or exceptionally . . . .”345 
345 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126 (emphasis added); accord Stena Rederi Aktiebolag 
v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [68]-[69] (Eng.), aff’d,
[2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.); LADAS, supra note 6, at 248 (“‘Temporairement,’ it was 
admitted at the Conference of The Hague, on the suggestion of the Czechoslovakian 
delegation, comprises also the periodical entries of vessels into the territorial waters of 
another country.”).  But see Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [32]-[34] 
(concluding that the negotiating history was inconclusive because the word “pénétreront” 
remained unchanged in the official French text after the Czechoslovakian delegation had 
urged changing “penetrate” to “enter” to cover regular and periodic entries). 
Additionally, the patentee in National Steel Car could have argued that § 272 
should not protect the use of the accused rail cars because of the very nature of these cars.  
The main use of these cars was to deliver lumber from Canada into the United States and 
then return to Canada.  See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 
1319, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Ninety percent of [the accused infringer’s] lumber 
shipments travel from Canada to the United States . . . . Because there is no market need 
for American lumber to be shipped into Canada, [the accused infringer’s] cars return to 
Canada empty 99.2 percent of the time.”).  Thus, the temporary-presence defense of 
§ 272 arguably should not apply to these rail cars whose main purpose is to regularly 
travel between Canada and the United States.  Cf. Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit was correct in rejecting the district court’s 
definition that would exclude from § 272 vehicles that spend a majority of their time in 
the United States.  Such an interpretation would fail to further the policy behind  § 272 of 
encouraging international commerce.  Additionally, such an interpretation would 
artificially discriminate between vehicles based on the locations of their countries of 
origin and their destinations.  For example, a Canadian airplane flying from Toronto to 
Atlanta, unloading in Atlanta, and immediately returning to Toronto would spend a 
majority of its time within the United States because of geography.  In contrast, a British 
airplane flying between London and New York would not spend a majority of its time 
within the United States because of geography.  There is no reason to differentiate 
between these two situations in determining whether § 272 applies.  Thus, an artificial 
distinction based on whether the vehicle spends a majority of its time in the United States 
makes no sense.346 
436 (“Surely there is an argument that an international ferry that regularly plies only 
between two ports and if it is built and acquired solely for the purpose of voyages 
between only the United Kingdom and Ireland, cannot claim [temporary-presence] 
protection.  An owner or operator of such a vessel should take precautions against 
infringing third-party rights.”).  However, such an interpretation of § 272 would be 
inconsistent with the underlying purpose of § 272—to protect even regular and periodic 
entries of foreign vehicles from patent infringement so as to prevent patent enforcement 
from inhibiting international commerce. 
346 Similarly, a test solely involving the actual duration of a vehicle in the United 
States would also be improper.  Such a test would artificially discriminate between 
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On the other hand, a pair of commentators has suggested that a broad 
interpretation of “temporarily” in a temporary-presence provision is improper because it 
would unacceptably decrease the incentive for innovation with respect to inventions used 
in means of transportation.347 These commentators argue that would-be infringers can 
register their ships in “‘flag of convenience’ states” that offer little patent protection, thus 
allowing their ships to be temporarily present in every other country in which they travel, 
and thus remaining immune from infringement liability in all those countries.348 Hence, 
they argue, such patentees could enforce their patent rights only for the making (as 
opposed to the using) of their inventions in the countries in which these ships were 
built.349 According to these commentators: 
 
different types of vessels, aircraft, and vehicles.  For example, a truck or a rail car 
traveling from Toronto to Atlanta to deliver goods and then return to Toronto would be in 
the United  States for several days because trucks and rail cars are relatively slow-moving 
vehicles.  In contrast, an airplane making that same trip for the same purpose would be in 
the United States only a few hours.  There is no reason to make such an artificial 
distinction. 
347 Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436-37.  These commentators were 
discussing the English Court of Appeal’s broad interpretation of “temporarily” in the 
U.K. temporary-presence statute, an interpretation that was similar to the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of § 272. 
348 Id. at 436. 
349 Id. 
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 From a practical perspective, this means that 
companies involved in innovation will be required to 
maintain a large portfolio of patents and will need to 
register in a large number of countries. The extra cost 
associated with maintenance of intellectual property rights 
can be expected to reduce drastically the incentive to seek 
patent protection and, in turn, diminish the incentive to 
engage in research and development activities.350 
This argument is somewhat specious, however.  It ignores the fact that vessels, 
aircraft, and vehicles can normally be used not only for international travel but also for 
purely domestic travel, for which the temporary-presence defense provides no haven for 
infringers.351 The amount of domestic travel that occurs is significant, particularly in 
geographically large countries such as the United States.352 Indeed, even if would-be 
 
350 Id. at 436-37. 
351 See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1331 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining “temporarily” as requiring entry “with the sole purpose of 
engaging in international commerce” (emphasis added)); Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 
F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“The distinction would be between [an aircraft] 
manufactured in France, delivered [to the United States] for use . . . in this country for 
domestic traffic . . . and a foreign aircraft arriving here on an international flight only to 
unload, turn about, reload and depart.”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975). 
352 For example, in the United States, the number of domestic airline flights far 
outpaces the number of international flights.  In 2004, there were 11,007,185 domestic 
departures, whereas there were only 715,294 international departures.  U.S. Department 
of Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, 
http://www.bts.gov/xml/air_traffic/src/index.xml (last visited Aug. 21, 2005).  To access 
this data, in the “Customize Table” section:  (1) check the boxes “Domestic” and 
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infringers were registering their vessels, aircraft, and vehicles in “flag of convenience”353 
countries to avoid infringement for international travel under the temporary-presence 
defense, patentees still could enforce their patent rights against infringers using their 
patented inventions domestically.  Thus, the patent system will continue to provide 
incentives for innovation in technologies used in means for transportation in spite of a 
broad interpretation of the term “temporarily” of § 272. 
3. Whether the Patented Invention Was Used Exclusively for the Needs of 
the Vehicle 
Next, the Federal Circuit considered whether the patented invention was used 
exclusively for the needs of the vehicle.354 The district court concluded that the invention 
was not used exclusively for the needs of the vehicle because as a structural invention, it 
did not “help propel the trains, help in positioning the trains, or help in [some] other way 
to make the trains work.”355 The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion 
and reasoning, holding that the phrase “exclusively for the needs of the . . . vehicle”356 
should not be interpreted “so narrowly as to exclude inventions . . . pertaining to the 
 
“International” for “Service Type”; (2) check the box “Total” for “Schedule Type”; (3) 
check the box “Departures” for “Airline Operating Statistical Type”; (4) select a date 
range of January 2004 through December 2004; and (5) click the “Submit” button. 
353 Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436. 
354 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332-33. 
355 Id. at 1332 (alteration in original). 
356 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
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construction of a vehicle.”357 According to the Federal Circuit, “[t]he district court 
erroneously overlaid the concept of ‘propulsive needs’ onto the statute; ‘structural needs’ 
are also encompassed within the plain meaning of the statute.”358 
Importantly, the court then observed that its broader interpretation was consistent 
with Brown v. Duchesne359 and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention,360 unlike the district 
court’s narrower interpretation.361 The court noted that in Brown, the Supreme Court 
described its holding as applying to “inventions ‘used in the construction, fitting out, or 
equipment’ of a vessel.”362 Likewise, the court noted that Article 5ter applies “to 
inventions used ‘in the construction or operation of . . . land vehicles . . . or of accessories 
of such . . . land vehicles.’”363 As the court stated, “[t]he text of the Paris Convention 
expressly applies to inventions used in either the construction or the operation of a 
vehicle, whereas the district court limited the meaning of the ‘exclusively for the needs of 
the . . . vehicle’ language in section 272 to only the latter.”364 
Once again, the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation is correct.  Importantly, the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of this element is consistent with Article 5ter of the Paris 
 
357 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332. 
358 Id. at 1332-33. 
359 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).  
360 Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78.  
361 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1333. 
362 Id. (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198).   
363 Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78). 
364 Id. (omission in original). 
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Convention.365 Such consistency is necessary to avoid conflicting with the United States’ 
international obligations under the Paris Convention.366 Indeed, any interpretation of 
§ 272 that was inconsistent with Article 5ter would improperly “impair the treaty-making 
capacity of the nation or . . . clog its power to regulate foreign commerce.”367 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the “exclusively for the needs of the 
. . . vehicle” element is consistent with the holding of the English court in Irish Ferries.368 
In Irish Ferries, the court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute applied where the 
 
365 See id. 
366 See Fed.-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“[A]bsent Congressional language to the contrary, statutes should not be interpreted to 
conflict with international obligations.”); cf. Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. 
(Irish Ferries I), [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [81] (Eng.), aff’d, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 
(Eng.) (holding that the U.K. temporary presence provision “should be construed in a 
way which is consistent with the meaning of” Article 5ter). 
367 Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), 
aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing Brown); cf. The Amiable Isabella, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) (“[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any 
clause, whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of 
power, and not an exercise of judicial function.”). 
368 Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 
66, [18], [37] (Eng.); Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [80]-[82]. 
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claims of the patent-in-suit covered the entire vessel as opposed to just a part of it.369 
Likewise, in National Steel Car, the Federal Circuit held that the U.S. provision applied 
where the claims of the patent-in-suit covered the entire vehicle—a drop-deck center-
beam rail car.370 Therefore, the Federal Circuit correctly interpreted the “exclusively for 
the needs of the . . . vehicle” element of § 272. 
4. Whether the Accused Cars Were Sold or Offered for Sale  in the 
United States 
Finally, the Federal Circuit considered the district court’s determination that § 272 
did not apply because the accused rail cars were offered for sale or sold.371 The district 
court based its conclusion on its findings that the cars’ manufacturer “had ‘offered the 
accused rail car[s] for sale to at least three different companies in the United States,’ and 
that ‘[the accused infringer], itself, may sell the accused rail cars to leasing companies in 
the United States.’”372 However, the Federal Circuit rejected this reasoning.373 With 
respect to sales by the third-party manufacturer, the court held that “[t]he ‘offered for sale 
or sold in . . . the United States’ provision of section 272 does not apply to sales made by 
third parties of embodiments of the invention other than those [embodiments] that 
 
369 Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [18], [37]; Irish Ferries I, [2002] 
EWHC (Pat) 737, [80]-[82]. 
370 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332-33. 
371 Id. at 1333-34. 
372 Id. at 1333. 
373 Id. 
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temporarily enter the United States.”374 With respect to the finding that the accused 
infringer “may” sell the accused cars, the Federal Circuit concluded that “a finding that 
[the accused infringer] ‘may’ engage in such conduct is, alone, insufficient to deprive 
[the accused infringer’s] section 272 defense of substantial merit.”375 
374 Id. (omission in original).  The Federal Circuit noted that this reasoning was 
consistent with the language of Brown, explaining: 
In Brown, the Court noted that the captain would be liable 
under the patent laws “if the captain had sold [the 
invention] there,” namely in the port of Boston.  This 
concept—the prohibition on selling the very embodiment 
of the invention that had been used in the vessel or vehicle 
while the vehicle was temporarily or accidentally in the 
United States—has been codified in the language of section 
272 that permits the statute’s application only “if the 
invention . . . is not offered for sale or sold in . . . the 
United States.” 
Id. (alteration and omissions in original; citations omitted) (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) at 196). 
375 Id. at 1334.  The Federal Circuit accepted this finding of fact by the district 
court.  Id. Moreover, according to the Federal Circuit: 
[W]e agree with the district court’s implicit conclusion that 
a sale-leaseback arrangement between [the accused 
infringer] and a U.S. company would, even at this 
preliminary-injunction phase, remove substantial merit 
from [the accused infringer’s § 272 defense]. . . . Not only 
might the sale-leaseback arrangement constitute a sale of 
“the invention,” as prohibited by the language in the second 
half of section 272, it also might transform the rail car into 
a vehicle of the United States and thus remove the use of 
the invention from the scope of the uses provided for in the 
first half of section 272. 
Id. The court also noted that if in the future, the patentee could show that the accused 
infringer decided to sell the cars to a U.S. company and then lease them back, “and that 
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The Federal Circuit correctly interpreted the “offered for sale or sold” element of 
§ 272 as applying only to sales of the actual temporarily-present vehicles themselves, 
rather than to sales of other vehicles embodying the patented invention, including those 
by third parties.  No object or policy of § 272 supports making a foreign party’s defense 
to infringement contingent upon the actions of third parties.376 Section 272 is directed to 
what does and does not constitute infringement.377 There is no support for the view that a 
third party’s sales activities are applicable to the infringement defense of § 272. 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit correctly rejected the district court’s 
interpretation of the term “offered for sale or sold” because the district court’s 
interpretation contradicts Congress’ use of the same or similar language in other parts of 
the Patent Act to refer solely to the activities of accused infringers, not third parties.  
“[T]he normal rule of statutory construction [is] that identical words used in different 
 
[this] chosen ownership structure would deprive [the accused infringer’s] section 272 
defense of substantial merit, [the patentee might] request appropriate relief at that time.”  
Id. 
376 Cf. Doyon, Ltd. v. United States, 214 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)) (“[T]o fully understand the 
meaning of a statute, [a court] look[s] ‘not only to the particular statutory language, but to 
the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.’”).  The major object and 
underlying policy of § 272 is to prevent patent enforcement from inhibiting international 
commerce.  NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330. 
377 See 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
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parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”378 The sections in the 
Patent Act in which Congress used terms such as “offered for sale or sold” or “offers to 
sell or sells” are all directed toward the activities of accused infringers.379 Notably, 
Congress used the term “offers to sell or sells” in § 271, the section immediately 
preceding § 272.380 In § 271, the term “offers to sell or sells” refers exclusively to the 
activities of an accused infringer, not the activities of third parties.  There is no reason 
that Congress would use the phrase “offers to sell or sells” one way in § 271 dealing with 
infringement and intend the phrase “offered for sale or sold” to mean something else in 
 
378 Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates v. Sec’y of Veterans 
Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
379 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (providing patentees with the right to 
exclude infringers from selling or offering to sell the invention); id. § 252 (providing 
provisional rights to those who would otherwise be infringers); id. § 271 (defining the 
activities by an infringer that constitute infringement). 
380 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).    Subsection (a) of § 271 provides:  “Except as 
otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or 
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States 
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”  Id. 
§ 271(a) (emphasis added). 
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§ 272—the very next section of the statute—which deals with a defense to 
infringement.381 
Moreover, where Congress intended to include the activity of third parties in sales 
or offers to sell, Congress used the term “on sale,” rather than the term “offered for sale 
or sold.”382 By its use of the term “on sale,” “Congress indicated that it does not matter 
who places the invention ‘on sale’; it only matters that someone—inventor, supplier or 
other third party—placed it on sale.”383 Hence, had Congress intended the sales activity 
of § 272 to apply to any sales of the patent invention, including those by third parties, it 
would have used the words “on sale” instead of “offered for sale or sold.”  Therefore, like 
its interpretation of all the other elements of § 272, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of 
this element is also correct. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF SECTION 272 
Although the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 272 in National Steel Car 
provides much guidance as to the scope and meaning of the elements of § 272, it does not 
resolve all questions that might arise.  Thus, this Part considers what the outer limits of 
the scope of § 272 might be.  This part examines what the limits might be of each of the 
following elements of § 272:  (A) “vessel,” “aircraft,” or “vehicle” of another country; 
 
381 See Lundy, 516 U.S. at 249-50 (“[W]e have been given no reason to believe 
that Congress meant the term ‘claim’ to mean one thing in § 6511 but to mean something 
else altogether in the very next section of the statute.”). 
382 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
383 Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).   
104 
(B) “affords similar privileges”; (C) “temporarily or accidentally” present; and (D) 
“exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft or vehicle.” 
A. “VESSEL,” “AIRCRAFT,” OR “VEHICLE” OF ANOTHER COUNTRY 
Section 272 applies to “vessels, aircraft or vehicles.”384 This language “is 
consistent with the general structure of the United States Code, which distinguishes 
among three types of conveyances:  vessels, which provide transportation on water; 
vehicles, which provide transportation on land; and aircraft, which provide transportation 
through the air.”385 
The Dictionary Act definition of “vessel” applies to § 272.386 The Dictionary Act 
broadly defines “vessel” as “includ[ing] every description of watercraft or other artificial 
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”387 
384 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
385 United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Mass. 2002) (citations 
omitted) (determining whether an aircraft is included as a “vehicle” under the USA 
Patriot Act of 2001). 
386 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 232 n.46 (1993) 
(applying the Dictionary Act definition of “vessel” in determining whether § 272 applied 
to spacecraft); Federico, supra note 84, at 214 (“The general definition of vessel and 
vehicle in 1 U.S.C.A. §§ 3 and 4 would be applicable here [in § 272].”); cf. Nat’l Steel 
Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying 
the Dictionary Act definition of “vehicle” in determining whether a rail car is a vehicle 
under § 272).  For a discussion of the Dictionary Act, see supra note 301. 
387 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). 
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Thus, § 272 should clearly apply to any type of ship or boat.388 Indeed, under the broad 
Dictionary Act definition of “vessel,”389 § 272 should apply to even a raft, a kayak, a 
small rowboat, or a JET SKI® watercraft.  However, it is doubtful that such a vessel 
would meet the “entering the United States temporarily” element of § 272 as the Federal 
Circuit has defined it—”entering for a period of time of  finite duration with the sole 
purpose of engaging in international commerce”390—because a vessel of this type would 
likely not be used to engage in international commerce. 
With respect to “aircraft,” the Dictionary Act does not define this term.391 
However, the plain meaning of “aircraft” according to a dictionary definition392 is:  “A 
 
388 When it emerged in the nineteenth century, the temporary-presence defense 
applied only to watercraft.  See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198-99 
(1856) (“[T]he rights of property and exclusive use granted to a patentee does not extend 
to a foreign vessel lawfully entering one of our ports; and that the use of such 
improvement, in the construction, fitting out, or equipment of such vessel, while she is 
coming into or going out of a port of the United States, is not an infringement of the 
rights of an American patentee, provided it was placed upon her in a foreign port, and 
authorized by the laws of the country to which she belongs.” (emphasis added)); Moffat, 
supra note 23, at 30 (quoting the first British temporary-presence statute as applying to 
“any foreign ship or vessel”).  Thus, given its origins, it is logical that § 272 should apply 
broadly to any type of ship or boat. 
389 1 U.S.C. § 3. 
390 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331 (emphasis added). 
391 See 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2000). 
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machine or device, such as an airplane, a helicopter, a glider, or a dirigible, that is 
capable of atmospheric flight.”393 Thus, keeping with the broad definitions of “vessel” 
and “vehicle” under the Dictionary Act,394 “aircraft” should be defined broadly under 
§ 272. Hence, any type of flying machine should be included—even a balloon or a 
blimp, for example. 
With respect to “vehicle,” the Dictionary Act definition applies.395 The 
Dictionary Act defines “vehicle” as “includ[ing] every description of carriage or other 
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on 
land.”396 This broad definition encompasses every type of land vehicle—such as rail 
cars, trucks, and automobiles.  Even small land vehicles such as motorcycles, bicycles, 
 
392 Where “terms used in a statute are undefined, [a court must] give them their 
ordinary meaning.”  Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995).  To 
determine the ordinary meaning of a statutory term, “it is appropriate [for a court] to 
consult dictionaries.”  Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); see The B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Courts may take judicial notice of … dictionaries.”). 
393 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 38. 
394 1 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. 
395 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (“[The Dictionary Act] definition controls our interpretation of ‘vehicle’ in 
section 272 . . . .”); Federico, supra note 84, at 214 (“The general definition of vessel and 
vehicle in 1 U.S.C.A. §§ 3 and 4 would be applicable here [in § 272].”). 
396 1 U.S.C. § 4. 
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and skateboards fit within this definition.397 However, as discussed above in connection 
with small watercraft,398 it is doubtful that such small vehicles would meet the “entering 
the United States temporarily” element of § 272 because vehicles of this type would 
likely not be used to engage in international commerce.399 
With respect to the limits of what constitutes a “vehicle” under § 272, the Federal 
Circuit noted in National Steel Car “that in some instances there may be ambiguity 
between containers that are merely the cargo of a vessel or vehicle, and vessels or 
vehicles that are themselves aggregated and transported in a collective fashion for greater 
efficiency.”400 The German court in Rolltrailer confronted a similar issue and held that 
roll trailers were vehicles under the German temporary-presence statute.401 Roll trailers 
“are used to transport containers . . . onto ships.”402 Roll trailers lack any means for self-
propulsion; instead, they are pulled by tractors on and off of the ships.403 Nevertheless, 
the court held that such roll trailers were vehicles rather than cargo.404 
397 Cf. LADAS, supra note 6, at 250 (“Engines of locomotion for land [under 
Article 5ter of the Paris Convention] may range from a train to a bicycle.”). 
398 See supra p. 105.
399 See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331. 
400 Id. at 1328. 
401 Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B8-B10. 
402 Id. at B6. 
403 See id. at B6-B7.  
404 See id. at B8-B10. 
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An interesting question that might arise in this context relates to intermodal 
containers—containers used to ship goods on multiple forms of transportation, usually 
ships, rail cars, and trucks.405 Such containers typically arrive in the United States on 
ships from foreign countries.406 These containers are then transferred to rail cars,407 
405 See James P. Miller, Trains Trucking Farther Out:  2 Intermodal Transfer 
Sites Located Away from Chicago, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2003, § 5, at 1; see also THE CAR 
AND LOCOMOTIVE CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRACTICES 205 (6th ed. 1997) [hereinafter 
CYCLOPEDIA]; Yuri V. Yevdokimov, Measuring Economic Benefits of Intermodal 
Transportation, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 439, 440 (2000) (“Intermodal transportation can be 
thought of as a process for transporting freight and passengers by means of a system of 
interconnected networks, involving various combinations of modes of transportation, in 
which all of the components are seamlessly linked and efficiently combined.”); 
Wikipedia, Intermodal Freight Transport, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermodal_freight_transport (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).  
See generally Donovan, supra note 10 (describing how intermodal transportation using 
containers has “transformed surface freight transportation worldwide”). 
406 Miller, supra note 405.  Many such containers arrive on the west coast 
containing goods from Asia.  See id. 
407 Not surprisingly, rail cars that haul intermodal containers are called intermodal 
rail cars.  See CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 405, at 205.  Such intermodal rail cars are often 
“double-stack” cars, which provide for two containers to be stacked on top of each rail 
car.  See id.; Wikipedia, supra note 405. 
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which take the containers to their next destinations.408 Eventually, when the containers 
are near their final destinations, the containers are transferred to trucks, which then 
deliver them to their final destinations.409 Intermodal containers are much like the roll 
trailers at issue in Rolltrailer. However, unlike roll trailers, intermodal containers do not 
have wheels.  As such, they must be loaded and unloaded from ships, rail cars, or trucks 
using crane equipment,410 rather than pulled by tractors as with roll trailers. 
A court could consider that intermodal containers are “vehicles” under § 272.  
Intermodal containers are “artificial contrivance[s] used . . . as a means of transportation 
on land.”411 After arriving on foreign ships, intermodal containers are used to transport 
goods on land on rail cars or trucks.  After being loaded onto rail cars or truck, the 
containers essentially become part of the rail cars or trucks—i.e., they are “vehicles that 
are themselves aggregated and transported in a collective fashion for greater 
 
408 Miller, supra note 405. 
409 Id. Before the use of containers became popular, intermodal operations 
involved the use of trailers with wheels, rather than containers.  See CYCLOPEDIA, supra 
note 405, at 205; Wikipedia, supra note 405.  This use of trailers on rail cars was 
commonly called “piggyback” service.  Id. 
410 Miller, supra note 405 (“A gantry crane . . . is used to transfer large cargo 
containers onto trucks.”). 
411 1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). 
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efficiency.”412 Moreover, applying § 272 to intermodal containers is consistent with the 
importance of containerized intermodal shipping to today’s global economy.413 
On the other hand, intermodal containers could be outside the scope of § 272.  
They arguably fall into the category of “containers that are merely the cargo of a vessel or 
vehicle.”414 Indeed, they are called containers.  Although in some sense they do 
essentially become part of the rail cars or trucks onto which they are loaded, in another 
sense they are more like boxes of goods loaded onto rail cars or trucks rather than 
aggregated vehicles.  Arguably, if intermodal containers were considered to be vehicles 
under § 272, then boxes of goods would also have to be considered to be vehicles.  
Moreover, intermodal containers lack wheels.  Thus, unlike the roll trailers at issue in the 
German Rolltrailer case, intermodal containers could never themselves be used “as a 
means of transportation on land,”415 even with the help of a trailer or other source of 
propulsion.  Therefore, intermodal containers lie near the edge of what constitutes a 
“vehicle” under § 272—perhaps just beyond that edge. 
 
412 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
413 See Donovan, supra note 10, at 13 (“[C]ontainerization has taken global 
commerce to new levels of integration and has brought greatly increased wealth to many 
parts of the world.”); see also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the 
importance of the temporary-presence defense in today’s global economy). 
414 Id. 
415 1 U.S.C. § 4. 
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B. “AFFORDS SIMILAR PRIVILEGES”
Section 272 requires reciprocity in that it applies to “any vessel, aircraft or vehicle 
of any country which affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft, or vehicles of the 
United States.”416 An issue could arise as to whether the “affords similar privileges” 
language means that the foreign country must merely have a temporary-presence 
provision similar to § 272, or whether it means that the foreign country must interpret its 
temporary-presence provision as applying to the situation at hand.  For example, in the 
situation in National Steel Car, although Canada has a temporary-presence provision 
similar to § 272,417 Canadian courts could have narrowly interpreted this provision as not 
covering a rail car entering Canada to deliver lumber and then returning to the United 
States.  Thus, in this hypothetical example, in spite of the existence of a Canadian 
temporary-presence statute, Canada really would not “afford similar privileges” to U.S. 
rail cars present under similar circumstances in Canada.  Hence, § 272 arguably should 
not apply to Canadian rail cars in this example, in spite of the existence of the Canadian 
temporary-presence statute. 
However, the court in Hughes Aircraft rejected such an argument.418 In Hughes 
Aircraft, the patentee argued “that the doctrine does not apply because the United 
Kingdom does not have a statute making the temporary presence doctrine applicable to 
 
416 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
417 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 23 (Can.).  For the text of this statute, see supra 
note 305. 
418 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 241 n.67 (1993) 
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spacecraft.”419 The court concluded that “[s]ection 272 does not require that the United 
Kingdom and the United States have identical temporary presence doctrines—only that 
the United Kingdom have a doctrine relating to ‘vessels, aircraft and vehicles.’”420 
Indeed, the wording of § 272 is “affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft, or vehicles 
of the United States,”421 not “affords similar privileges to similar vessels, aircraft, or 
vehicles.”  Thus, the reciprocity requirement of § 272 is likely met where the foreign 
nation in question merely provides for a temporary-presence defense similar to that of 
§ 272.422 
C. “TEMPORARILY OR ACCIDENTALLY” PRESENT 
The Federal Circuit interpreted “entering the United States temporarily” in § 272 
as meaning “entering for a period of finite duration with the sole purpose of engaging in 
international commerce.”423 A vehicle goes beyond the limits of being temporarily 
present under § 272 once it engages in any domestic commerce, rather than purely 
 
419 Id. 
420 Id. 
421 § 272. 
422 Such a provision could be created by a statute (such as § 272 today), case law 
(such as in Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856) before the enactment of 
§ 272), or even a self-executing treaty between the United States and the country in 
question. 
423 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
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international commerce.424 Thus, the rail cars in National Steel Car would have been 
outside the protection of § 272 had they entered the United States with Canadian lumber, 
dropped it off, reloaded with cargo, and delivered that cargo to another U.S. 
destination.425 On the other hand, § 272 would still protect these rail cars if they were to 
reload with cargo in the United States and ship the cargo directly back to Canada, instead 
of returning empty to Canada.426 
Unlike the term “temporarily,” no court has ever interpreted what an “accidental” 
presence would be under § 272.  “Temporarily” and “accidentally” cannot mean the same 
thing; otherwise the use of “accidentally” in addition to “temporarily” would be 
redundant.427 Thus, unlike for a temporary entry,428 there should be no time or purpose 
 
424 See id. at 1331-32; Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“The distinction would be between [an aircraft] manufactured in 
France, delivered [to the United States] for use . . . in this country for domestic traffic . . . 
and a foreign aircraft arriving here on an international flight only to unload, turn about, 
reload and depart.”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975). 
425 See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332. 
426 See id. at 1331 n.12. 
427 See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997) (“The Court will 
avoid an interpretation of a statute that ‘renders some words altogether redundant.’”); 
Clark v. United States, 322 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Alaska, 521 U.S. at 
59). 
428 NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331 (restricting temporary entries under § 272 to those of 
“finite duration with the sole purpose of engaging in international commerce”). 
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restriction on an accidental entry into the United States.  Indeed, if a vessel, aircraft, or 
vehicle enters the United States accidentally, it should be immune from infringement 
liability under § 272 even if it then remains in the United States permanently.429 
The ordinary meaning of “accidental” is:  “Occurring unexpectedly, 
unintentionally, or by chance.”430 Hence, any unexpected or unintentional entry into the 
United States should be accidental under § 272.431 For example, the following should be 
 
429 Cf. Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA 
(Civ) 66, [25] (Eng.) (“The purpose of [Article 5ter of the Paris Convention] was to 
prevent national patents impinging upon foreign vessels coming into and out of territorial 
waters temporarily and also permanently if the cause was accidental.” (emphasis added)); 
Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, 
[66] (Eng.) (“These two words are intended to deal with unrelated activities, 
[“temporarily”] being concerned with deliberate short-term entries, [and “accidentally”] 
being concerned with unintentional entries, no matter how long they last.” (emphasis 
added)), aff’d, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.).  But cf. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. 
Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“[T]he committee [drafting Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention] indicated that the words ‘temporarily’ and ‘accidentally’ were chosen to 
cover entries into port for more or less brief periods whether periodically or exceptionally 
and whether unintentionally or not.” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
430 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 11. 
431 See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“[Where] 
terms used in a statute are undefined, [a court must] give them their ordinary meaning.”). 
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accidental entries into the United States:  (1) a foreign ship taking unplanned refuge in a 
U.S. port because of a storm; (2) a foreign airplane making an emergency landing at a 
U.S. airport because of engine trouble; and (3) a foreign rail car entering the United 
States on a train diverted to an alternate track to avoid a derailment on the foreign track 
on which it was originally supposed to have traveled. 
D. “EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE NEEDS OF THE VESSEL, AIRCRAFT OR 
VEHICLE”
The interpretation of the “exclusively for the needs” element of § 272 must be 
consistent with Brown v. Duchesne and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention.432 The 
holding of Brown applies to inventions used “in the construction, fitting out, or 
equipment of such vessel.”433 Similarly, Article 5ter applies to inventions used “in the 
body of [a] vessel, in the machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories” or “in the 
construction or operation of aircraft or land vehicles.”434 Thus, the “exclusively for the 
needs” language of § 272 should be broadly interpreted.435 As one commentator 
 
432 See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1333. 
433 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198 (1856) 
434 Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78.  Unlike § 272, Article 5ter has 
different provisions for vessels on the one hand and vehicles and aircraft on the other 
hand with respect to the “exclusively for the needs” requirement. 
435 Cf. LADAS, supra note 6, at 249 (“The needs of the vessel [under Article 5ter of 
the Paris Convention] must be understood in a broad sense, as including every apparatus 
or machine necessary for the navigation, fitting out, and good equipment of a vessel.”); 
Moffat, supra note 23, at 40 (“It might well be argued that every piece of equipment 
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suggested in 1930 concerning Article 5ter: “This wide exemption is justified by the nature 
of the modern vessel, by the fact that a ship enters only the territorial waters of a country, 
and by a desire to exempt vessels from all unnecessary inconveniences and 
impediments.”436 
Under such a broad interpretation of this element, something such as the heating 
and air conditioning system of a vehicle should be included within the scope of § 272.437 
Even something such as a DVD player built into a minivan could be considered within 
the scope of § 272 because it is part of the “construction . . . or equipment”438 of the 
 
throughout a ship, whether it be a winch or a can-opener, is employed exclusively for the 
needs of the ship [under Article 5ter.”).  But cf. Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436 
(“The wording of [the U.K. temporary-presence statute and Article 5ter] shows that the 
exemption is narrow, covering only ‘use’ of patented invention [sic] and that which is 
‘exclusively for the needs’ of the vessel.”). 
436 LADAS, supra note 6, at 249; see also NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330 (“Article 5ter 
of the Paris Convention demonstrate[s] a concern to leave the channels of international 
commerce, or more accurately the vessels and vehicles that pass through these channels, 
free from the excessive burdens that would result if such vessels or vehicles had to 
conform to the patent laws of all nations that the vessel or vehicle visited during its 
lifetime.”). 
437 Cf. LADAS, supra note 6, at 249 (“[The needs of a vessel under Article 5ter of 
the Paris Convention] include machinery necessary for the lighting of the ship, its 
heating, and the like.”). 
438 Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198. 
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minivan and used for the needs of its passengers.439 Moreover, different vessels, aircraft, 
and vehicles have different needs.440 For example, the needs of a cruise ship involve the 
entertainment of its passengers.  Thus, even a slot machine built into such a cruise ship 
could be considered to be used exclusively for the needs of the vessel.441 This 
interpretation is consistent with the underlying purpose of § 272 and would allow such a 
cruise ship to travel from country to country unfettered by the burden of “complying with 
multiple, inconsistent rights of exclusion provided by the patent regimes of [these] 
countries.”442 
439 See 5 CHISUM, supra note 52, § 16.05[4], at 16-247 (“The phrase ‘exclusively 
for the needs of the vessel, aircraft of vehicle’ in Section 272 should cover any use for the 
benefit of the passengers or crew or for the operation of the vessel.” (emphasis added)).  
But cf. Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436 (“If the device, for instance, is equipment 
for entertainment, then this should not be covered by the exemption [in the U.K. 
temporary-presence statute].”). 
440 See LADAS, supra note 6, at 249 (“Every vessel has different needs.  A floating 
hospital, a cargo boat, a sailboat, and a steamer have not the same needs.”). 
441 If the slot machine were not actually part of the construction of the boat, 
however, it should not be considered to be used exclusively for the needs of the vessel. 
442 Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although it may not be well-known, the temporary-presence defense of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 272 is a potentially powerful defense under the proper circumstances.  This defense 
protects foreign vessels, aircraft, or vehicles from patent infringement liability where 
these vessels, aircraft, or vehicles enter the United States temporarily or accidentally.  
Thanks to the Federal Circuit’s recent broad and correct interpretation of the scope of 
§ 272, the temporary-presence defense should assume an increasingly important role in 
today’s global economy.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s decision should ensure that the 
temporary-presence defense will continue to prevent patent enforcement from interfering 
with the “planes, trains, and automobiles” of international commerce. 
